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This paper proposes a theory of pricing based on two facts: customers care about the
fairness of prices, and rms take these concerns into account when setting prices.
The theory assumes that customers dislike unfair prices, namely those marked up
steeply over cost. Since costs are unobservable, customers must extract them from
prices. The theory assumes that customers infer less than rationally: when a price
rises aer a cost increase, customers partially misattribute the higher price to a
highermarkup—which they nd unfair. Firms anticipate this response and trim their
price increases, which drives the passthrough of costs into prices below one: prices
are somewhat rigid. Embedded in a New Keynesian model as a replacement for the
usual pricing frictions, our theory produces monetary-policy nonneutrality: when
monetary policy loosens and ination rises, customers misperceive markups as
higher and feel unfairly treated; rmsmitigate this perceived unfairness by reducing
their markups; in general equilibrium, employment rises. The New Keynesianmodel
also features a hybrid short-run Phillips curve, realistic impulse responses of output
and employment to monetary and technology shocks, and an upward-sloping long-
run Phillips curve.
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1. Introduction
Prices are neither exactly xed nor fully responsive to cost shocks (Carlsson and Skans 2012; De
Loecker et al. 2016; Caselli, Chatterjee, and Woodland 2017; Ganapati, Shapiro, and Walker 2019).
Such price rigidity is of rst-order importance, as it determines the transmission of shocks and
government policies to the economy.
Asked why they show such restraint when setting prices, rm managers explain that they
avoid alienating customers, who balk at paying prices that they regard as unfair (Blinder et al.
1998). Yet theories of price rigidity almost never include fairness considerations (Blanchard 1990;
Mankiw and Reis 2010).1 The notable exception is Rotemberg (2005), which calls attention to the
role of fairness in pricing. Due to its innovative nature, however, the theory itself is somewhat
difcult to analyze or use in other frameworks (see section 2).
This paper therefore develops a pricing theory that incorporates the fairness concerns ob-
served among rms and their customers and uses such concerns to generate the price rigidity
observed in the data. The theory is designed to be easy to analyze, permitting closed-form ex-
pressions for price markups and passthroughs, as well as a set of comparative statics. It is also
designed for easy transferal to other frameworks: here, we port it to a New Keynesian model to
study its macroeconomic implications.
The rst element of our theory is that customers dislike paying prices marked up heavily
over marginal costs because they nd these prices unfair, and that rms understand this. This
assumption draws upon evidence from numerous surveys of consumers and rms, our own
survey of French bakers, and religious and legal texts (section 3). We formalize this assumption by
weighting each unit of consumption in the utility function by a fairness factor that is a function of
the markup that customers perceive rms to charge for the consumed good: the fairness factor is
decreasing in the perceived markup (since higher markups seem less fair) and concave (since
people tend to respond more strongly to increases in markups than to decreases).
Because customers do not observe rms’ costs but need them to assessmarkups, their fairness
perceptions depend upon their cost estimates. The second element of our theory is that customers
update their beliefs aboutmarginal costs less than rationally. First, customers underinfermarginal
cost from price: they form beliefs that depend upon some anchor, which may be their prior
expectation of marginal cost. Second, insofar as customers do update their beliefs about marginal
cost from price, they engage in a form of proportional thinking by estimating marginal costs that
1Fairness has received more attention in other contexts: Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), and Benjamin
(2015) add fairness to labor-market models; Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Charness and Rabin (2002) to
game-theoretic models; and Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) to contract-theoretic models. For surveys of the fairness
literature, see Fehr and Gachter (2000), Sobel (2005), and Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009).
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are proportional to price. We dub this pair of assumptions subproportional inference. They draw
upon evidence that during inationary periods people seem to underinfer increases in nominal
costs, and more generally that people tend to infer less than they should about others’ private
information from others’ actions (see also section 3).
We begin our analysis by embedding these psychological elements into a model of monopoly
pricing (section 4). The monopolist’s prot-maximizing price features a markup over marginal
cost that decreases in the price elasticity of demand. We assume a standard utility function
with the property that customers who did not care about fairness would exhibit constant price
elasticity of demand. The monopolist best responds by using a constant markup that produces
exible prices, which move proportionally to marginal costs. If customers cared about fairness
and rationally inverted price to uncover the hidden marginal cost, the same pricing rule would
be an equilibrium. The reason is that when price increases by x%, customers correctly infer that
marginal cost has increased by x%, and therefore that the markup has not changed. Since the
price change does not change the perceived markup, the price elasticity of demand does not
change, and neither does the markup.
Once fairness concerns and subproportional inference are combined, however, pricing
changes. Demand decreases in price not only through the standard channel, but also through
a fairness channel. When customers see a higher price, they attribute it partially to a higher
marginal cost and partially to a higher markup—which they nd unfair. Thus the higher price
lowers their marginal utility of consumption, which further decreases demand. This renders
demand more elastic than it would be otherwise, leading the monopoly to lower its markup.
Second, fairness concerns and subproportional inference create price rigidity. Aer a price
increase spurred by a cost increase, customers underappreciate the increase inmarginal cost and
partially misattribute the higher price to higher markup. Since the fairness factor is decreasing
and concave in the perceivedmarkup, it ismore elastic at higher perceivedmarkups. This property
translates to demand, which is more price elastic at higher perceived markups. Hence, aer
the cost increase, the monopoly reduces its markup. As a result, the price increases less than
proportionally to the underlying marginal cost: the passthrough of marginal costs into prices
falls short of one. This mild form of price rigidity is consistent with the response of prices to
marginal-cost shocks estimated in empirical studies.
Theories of price rigidity are central to macroeconomic models. To illustrate how our theory
can be embedded into such a model, and develop its implications, we substitute it for the usual
pricing frictions in a New Keynesian model (section 5). Again we assume that customers infer
less than they should about marginal cost from price. In the dynamic model, subproportional
inferencemeans that in each period t , customers average their period-t − 1 beliefs aboutmarginal
2
costs with beliefs that are proportional to current prices.
The macroeconomic model yields several realistic properties. First, monetary policy is non-
neutral in the short run: it affects output and employment. This property arises through the same
channel as in the monopoly model: expansionary monetary policy increases prices and nominal
marginal costs; customers partially misattribute higher prices to higher markups, which they
perceive as unfair; as a result, the price elasticities of the demands for goods rise; rms respond
by reducing markups, thus stimulating the economy. Second, the New Keynesian Phillips curve
is hybrid: it links current employment to not only current and expected future ination but also
past ination. This property emerges because beliefs about marginal costs are backward-looking,
forcing rms to account for both past and future ination when setting prices. Third, the model
yields reasonable impulse responses to monetary shocks and to technology shocks when the pa-
rameters governing fairness concerns and subproportional inference are calibrated to match the
microevidence on passthrough. In particular, the impulse responses of employment are hump-
shaped. Fourth, monetary policy is nonneutral in the long run: higher steady-state ination leads
to higher steady-state employment; that is, the long-run Phillips curve is nonvertical.
Our macroeconomic model is also consistent with survey evidence that ination angers
people—who attribute it to commercial greed—and that people appreciate deation. In our
model, because people partially misattribute higher prices to higher markups, ination leads
them to perceive transactions as less fair, generating disutility. Conversely, deation leads people
to misperceive markups as lower and deem transactions more fair, generating utility.
2. Related literature
Rotemberg (2005) developed the rst theory of price rigidity based on fairness considerations.2
Customers in his model care about rms’ altruism, which they re-evaluate following every price
change. Customers buy a normal amount from a rm unless they can reject the hypothesis that
the rm is altruistic, in which case they withhold all demand in order to lower the rm’s prots.
Firms react to the discontinuity in demand by refraining from passing on small cost increases,
creating price stickiness.
We depart from Rotemberg’s discontinuous, buy-normally-or-buy-nothing formulation to one
in which customers continuously reduce demand as the unfairness of the transaction increases.
Our continuous formulation seems more realistic and offers greater tractability. Its tractability
allows us to obtain closed-form expressions for themarkup and passthrough, and thus to perform
a range of comparative-statics exercises. The tractability also allows us to embed our pricing
2Rotemberg (2011) explores other implications of fairness for pricing, such as price discrimination.
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theory into a standard New Keynesian model, to calibrate the theory’s parameters based on
microevidence, and to perform standard simulations.
More broadly, our approach to fairness differs from the popular social-preferences approach,
developed by Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and used by Rotemberg. That approach
models people as caring about one another’s payoffs, whether positively or negatively, leading
a consumer who feels unfairly treated by a rm to withhold demand to hurt the rm’s prots.
In our model, by contrast, because customers simply fail to savor unfairly priced goods, they
withhold demand irrespective of whether it harms the rm. An advantage of our approach,
which appears in our macroeconomic application, is that fairness continues to matter in general
equilibrium. This is not the case with many social preferences: when people’s utility can be
written as a separable function of their own and others’ allocations, social preferences do not
affect general-equilibrium prices or allocations (Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Sobel 2007).
3. Microevidence supporting the assumptions
This section presents microevidence in support of the assumptions underlying our theory. First,
we show that people care about the fairness of prices, and that they assess a price to be fair when
it carries a low markup over marginal cost. Second, we document that people erroneously infer
marginal costs from prices and thus misperceive markups. Finally, we show that rms account
for customers’ fairness concerns when they set prices.
3.1. Customers’ fairness concerns
Our theory assumes that customers deem a price to be unfair when it entails a high markup
over marginal cost, and that they dislike such prices. Here we review evidence supporting this
assumption.
Price increases due to higher demand. Our assumption implies that people will nd price in-
creases unjustied by cost increases to be unfair. In a survey of Canadian residents, Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, p. 729) document this pattern. They describe the following situation:
“A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. Themorning aer a large snowstorm, the
store raises the price to $20.” Among 107 respondents, only 18% regard this pricing as acceptable,
whereas 82% regard it as unfair.
Subsequent studies conrm and rene Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s results. For example,
in a survey of 1,750 households in Switzerland and Germany, Frey and Pommerehne (1993, pp. 297–
298) conrm that customers dislike a price increase that involves an increase inmarkup; so too do
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Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov (1991, p. 389) in a comparative survey of 391 respondents in Russia
and 361 in the United States.
One concern about the snow-shovel evidence is that people may nd the price increase unfair
simply because it occurs during a period of hardship. To address this question, Maxwell (1995)
asks 72 students at a Florida university about price increases following an ordinary increase in
demand as well as those following a hardship-driven increase in demand. While more nd price
increases in the hardship environment unfair (86% versus 69%), a substantial majority in each
case perceive the price increase as unfair.
Price increases due to higher costs. Conversely, our fairness assumption suggests that customers
tolerate price increases following cost increases so long as the markup remains constant. Kah-
neman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, pp. 732–733) identify this pattern: “Suppose that, due to a
transportation mixup, there is a local shortage of lettuce and the wholesale price has increased.
A local grocer has bought the usual quantity of lettuce at a price that is 30 cents per head higher
than normal. The grocer raises the price of lettuce to customers by 30 cents per head.” Among 101
respondents, 79% regard the pricing as acceptable, and only 21% nd it unfair. In a survey of 307
Dutch individuals, Gielissen, Dutilh, and Graaand (2008, table 2) also nd that price increases
following cost increases are fair, while those following demand increases are not.
Price decreases allowed by lower costs. Our assumption equally implies that it is unfair for rms
not to pass along cost decreases. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, p. 734) nd milder
support for this reaction. They describe the following situation: “A small factory produces tables
and sells all that it canmake at $200 each. Because of changes in the price of materials, the cost of
making each table has recently decreased by $20. The factory does not change its price of tables.”
Only 47% of respondents nd this unfair, despite the elevated markup.
Subsequent studies, however, nd that people do expect the price to fall aer a cost reduction.
Kalapurakal, Dickson, and Urbany (1991) conduct a survey of 189 business students in the United
States, and asked them to consider the following scenario: “A department store has been buying
an oriental oor rug for $100. The standard pricing practice used by department stores is to price
oor rugs at double their cost so the selling price of the rug is $200. This covers all the selling
costs, overheads and includes prot. The department store can sell all of the rugs that it can buy.
Suppose because of exchange rate changes the cost of the rug rises from $100 to $120 and the
selling price is increased to $220. As a result of another change in currency exchange rates, the
cost of the rug falls by $20 back to $100.” Then two alternative scenarios were evaluated: “The
department store continues to sell the rug for $220” compared to “The department store reduces
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the price of the rug to $200.” The scenario in which the department store reduces the price in
response to the decrease in cost was considered signicantly more fair: the fairness rating was
+2.3 instead of −0.4 (where −3 is extremely unfair and +3 extremely fair). Similarly, in survey of
US respondents, Konow (2001, table 6) nds that if a factory that sells a table at $150 locates a
supplier charging $20 less for materials, the new fair price is $138, well below $150.
Norms about markups. Religious and legal texts written over the ages display a long history of
norms regarding markups—which suggests that people deeply care about markups. For example,
Talmudic law species that the highest fair and allowable markup when trading essential items
is 20% of the production cost, or one-sixth of the nal price (Friedman 1984, p. 198).
Another example comes from 18th-century France, where local authorities xed bread prices
by publishing “fair” prices in ofcial decrees. In the city of Rouen, for instance, the ofcial bread
prices took the costs of grain, rent, milling, wood, and labor into account, and granted a “modest
prot” to the baker (Miller 1999, p. 36). Thus, ofcials xed the markup that bakers could charge.
Even today, French bakers attach such importance to convincing their customers of fair markups
that their trade union decomposes the cost of bread and the rationale for any price rise into
minute detail (https://perma.cc/GQ28-JMFC).
Twomore examples come from regulation in theUnited States. First, return-on-cost regulation
for public utilities, which limits the markups charged by utilities, has been justied not only
on efciency grounds but also on fairness grounds (Zajac 1985; Jones and Mann 2001). Second,
most US states have anti-price-gouging legislation that limits the prices that rms can charge
in periods of upheaval (such as a hurricane or an epidemic). But by exempting price increases
justied by higher costs, the legislation only outlaws price increases caused by higher markups
(Rotemberg 2009, pp. 74–77).
Fairness and willingness to pay. We assume that customers who purchase a good at an unfair
price derive less utility from consuming it; as a result, unfair pricing reduces willingness to pay.
Substantial evidence documents that unfair prices make customers angry, and more generally
that unfair outcomes trigger feelings of anger (Rotemberg 2009, pp. 60–64). A small body of
evidence also suggests that customers reduce purchases when they feel unfairly treated. In a
telephone survey of 40 US consumers, Urbany, Madden, and Dickson (1989) explore—by looking
at a 25-cent ATM surcharge—whether a price increase justied by a cost increase is perceived as
more fair than an unjustied one, and whether fairness perceptions affect customers’ propensity
to buy. While 58% of respondents judge the introduction of the surcharge fair when justied
by a cost increase, only 29% judge it fair when not justied (table 1, panel B). Moreover, those
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people who nd the surcharge unfair are indeedmore likely to switch banks (52% versus 35%, see
table 1, panel C). Similarly, Piron and Fernandez (1995) present survey and laboratory evidence
that customers who nd a rm’s actions unfair tend to reduce their purchases with that rm.
3.2. Subproportional inference of costs
Customers do not observe rms’ marginal costs. Consequently, their perception of the fairness
of rms’ prices depends upon their estimates of these costs. Since customers cannot easily
learn about hidden costs, however, they are prone to develop mistaken beliefs. To describe such
misperceptions, we assume subproportional inference. First, consumers underinfer marginal
cost from price: they form beliefs that depend upon some anchor. Second, insofar as consumers
do update their beliefs about cost from price, they engage in a form of proportional thinking by
estimating marginal costs that are proportional to price. We now review evidence that supports
this pair of assumptions.
Underinference in general. Numerous experimental studies establish that people underinfer
other people’s information from those other people’s actions (Eyster 2019). In the context of
bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information, Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), Holt and
Sherman (1994), Carillo and Palfrey (2011), and others show that bargainers underappreciate the
adverse selection in trade. The papers collected in Kagel and Levin (2002) present evidence that
bidders underattend to the winner’s curse in common-value auctions. In a metastudy of social-
learning experiments, Weizsacker (2010) nds that subjects behave as if they underinfer their
predecessors’ private information from their actions. In a voting experiment, Esponda and Vespa
(2014) show that people underinfer others’ private information from their votes. Subproportional
inference encompasses such underinference.
Underinference from prices. Shar, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) report survey evidence that
points at underinference in the context of pricing. They presented 362 people in New Jersey with
the following thought experiment: “Changes in the economy oen have an effect on people’s
nancial decisions. Imagine that the US experienced unusually high ination which affected all
sectors of the economy. Imagine that within a six-month period all benets and salaries, as well
as the prices of all goods and services, went up by approximately 25%. You now earn and spend
25%more than before. Six months ago, you were planning to buy a leather armchair whose price
during the 6-month period went up from $400 to $500. Would you be more or less likely to buy
the armchair now?” The higher prices were distinctly aversive: while 55% of respondents were as
likely to buy as before and 7% were more likely to buy as before, 38% of respondents were less
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Table 1. Opinions about price movements in Japan, 2001–2017
Opinion about perceived price change
Perceived price change Number of respondents Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Prices have gone down 18,257 43.0% 34.2% 21.9%
Prices have gone up 68,491 2.5% 13.0% 83.7%
Data come from the 60 waves of the Opinion Survey on the General Public’s Mindset and Behavior conducted by the
Bank of Japan between September 2001 and December 2017. Although the survey is administered since 1993, survey
results are available online only since 2001: the table is based on these online results. The survey was conducted
nearly every quarter with a random sample of 4,000 adults living in Japan. The average response rate was 57.2%.
Respondents answered the following question: “How do you think prices (dened as overall prices of goods and
services you purchase) have changed compared with one year ago?” (question 10, 11, 12, or 13, depending on the
survey). Respondents who answered “prices have gone down signicantly” or “prices have gone down slightly”
are described on the rst row of the table. Respondents who answered “prices have gone up signicantly” or
“prices have gone up slightly” are described on the second row of the table. The rest of the respondents, who
answered “prices have remained almost unchanged,” do not feature in the table. Those who answered that prices
had gone down then answered “How would you describe your opinion of the price decline?” (question 10, 11, 12,
13, or 15, depending on the survey). The third column gives the share of those respondents who answered “rather
favorable,” the fourth column the share who answered “neither favorable nor unfavorable,” and the h column
the share who answered “rather unfavorable.” Those who answered that prices had gone up then answered “How
would you describe your opinion of the price rise?” (question 10, 11, 12, or 13, depending on the survey, and only
aer June 2004). The third, fourth, and h column give the share of those respondents who answered “rather
favorable,” “neither favorable nor unfavorable,” and “rather unfavorable.” Detailed survey results are available at
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/o_survey/index.htm/.
likely to buy then before (p. 355). Our model makes this prediction. While consumers who update
subproportionally recognize that higher prices signal higher marginal costs, they stop short of
rational inference. Consequently, consumers perceive markups to be higher when prices are
higher. These consumers deem today’s transaction less fair, so they have a lower willingness to
pay for the armchair.
A survey conducted by Shiller (1997) conrms that when consumers see higher prices, they
systematically believe that markups are higher. Among 120 respondents in the United States,
85% report that they dislike ination because when they “go to the store and see that prices are
higher,” they “feel a little angry at someone” (p. 21). The most common perceived culprits are
“manufacturers,” “store owners,” and “businesses,” whose transgressions include “greed” and
“corporate prots” (p. 25). In the presence of higher prices, many people indeed infer that rms
have increased their prot margins, which angers them.
Underinference from ination and deation. In our model, customers dislike ination because
it leads them to perceive higher markups; conversely, they enjoy deation because it leads them
to perceive lower markups. An opinion poll conducted by the Bank of Japan between 2001 and
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Table 2. Description of rm surveys about pricing
Survey Country Period Number of rms
Blinder et al. (1998) United States (US) 1990–1992 200
Hall, Walsh, and Yates (2000) United Kingdom (GB) 1995 654
Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten (2005) Sweden (SE) 2000 626
Nakagawa, Hattori, and Takagawa (2000) Japan (JP) 2000 630
Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson (2006) Canada (CA) 2002–2003 170
Kwapil, Baumgartner, and Scharler (2005) Austria (AT) 2004 873
Aucremanne and Druant (2005) Belgium (BE) 2004 1,979
Loupias and Ricart (2004) France (FR) 2004 1,662
Lunnemann and Matha (2006) Luxembourg (LU) 2004 367
Hoeberichts and Stokman (2006) Netherlands (NL) 2004 1,246
Martins (2005) Portugal (PT) 2004 1,370
Alvarez and Hernando (2005) Spain (ES) 2004 2,008
Langbraaten, Nordbo, and Wulfsberg (2008) Norway (NO) 2007 725
Olafsson, Petursdottir, and Vignisdottir (2011) Iceland (IS) 2008 262
2017 paints this pattern (table 1). During this period, Japan alternated between ination and
deation. Yet people held diametrically opposed views toward ination and deation. Of the
18,000 respondents who perceived a decrease in the price of the goods they purchased, 43% saw
it as a favorable development, while 22% saw it as an unfavorable development; but of the 68,000
respondents who perceived a price increase, only 3% saw it as a favorable development, while
84% saw it as an unfavorable development.
Proportional thinking. Finally, a small body of evidencedocuments that people thinkproportion-
ally, even in settings that do not call for proportional thinking (Bushong, Rabin, and Schwartzstein
2017). In particular, Thaler (1980) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrate that people’s
willingness to invest time in lowering the price of a good by a xed dollar amount depends
negatively upon the good’s price. Rather than care about the absolute savings, people appear to
care about the proportional savings. Someone who thinks about a price discount not in absolute
terms but as a proportion of the purchase price may think about marginal cost not in absolute
terms but rather as a percentage of price. If so, then the simplest assumption is that, insofar as
the person infers marginal cost from price, she infers a marginal cost proportional to price.
3.3. Firms’ fairness concerns
In our model, in response to their customers’ fairness concerns, rms pay great attention to
fairness when setting prices. This seems to hold true in the real world: rms identify fairness to
be a major concern in price-setting.
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Surveys of rms. Following Blinder et al. (1998), researchers have surveyed more than 12,000
rms across developed economies about their pricing practices (table 2). The typical study asks
managers to evaluate the relevance of different pricing theories from the economics literature to
explain their own pricing, in particular price rigidity. Amongst the theories that the managers
deemmost important, some version of fairness invariably appears, oen called “implicit con-
tracts” and described as follows: “rms tacitly agree to stabilize prices, perhaps out of fairness to
customers.” Indeed, fairness appeals to rms more than any other theory, with a median rank
of 1 and a mean rank of 1.9 (table 3). The second most popular explanation for price rigidity
takes the form of nominal contracts—prices do not change because they are xed by contracts: it
has a median rank of 3 and a mean rank of 2.6. Two common macroeconomic theories of price
rigidity—menu costs and information delays—do not resonate at all with rms, who rank them
amongst the least popular theories, with mean and median ranks above 9.
Firms also understand that customers bristle at unfair markups. According to Blinder et al.
(1998, pp. 153–157), 64% of rms say that customers do not tolerate price increases aer demand
increases, while 71% of rms say that customers do tolerate price increase aer cost increases.
Firms seem to agree that the norm for fair pricing revolves around a constant markup over
marginal cost. Based on a survey of businessmen in the United Kingdom, Hall and Hitch (1939,
p. 19) report that the “the ‘right’ price, the one which ‘ought’ to be charged” is widely perceived to
be a markup (generally, 10%) over average cost. Okun (1975, p. 362) also observes in discussions
with business people that “empirically, the typical standard of fairness involves cost-oriented
pricing with a markup.”
Survey of French bakers. To better understand how rms incorporate fairness into their pricing
decisions, we interviewed 31 bakers in France in 2007. The French bread market makes a good
case study because the market is large, bakers set their prices freely, and French people care
enormously about bread.3 We sampled bakeries in cities and villages around Grenoble, Aix-en-
Provence, Paimpol, and Paris. The interviews show that bakers are guided by norms of fairness
when they adjust prices in order to preserve customer loyalty. In particular, cost-based pricing
is widely used. Bakers raise the price of bread only in response to increases in the cost of our,
3In 2005, bakeries employed 148,000 workers, for a yearly turnover of 3.2 billion euros (Fraichard 2006). Since
1978, French bakers have been free to set their own prices, except during the inationary period 1979–1987 when
price ceilings and growth caps were imposed. For centuries, bread prices caused major social upheaval in France.
Miller (1999, p. 35) explains that before the French Revolution, “affordable bread prices underlay any hopes for
urban tranquility.” During the Flour War of 1775, mobs chanted “if the price of bread does not go down, we will
exterminate the king and the blood of the Bourbons”; following these riots, “under intense pressure from irate and
nervous demonstrators, the young governor of Versailles had ceded and xed the price ‘in the King’s name’ at two
sous per pound, the mythohistoric just price inscribed in the memory of the century” (Kaplan 1996, p. 12).
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utilities, or wages. Bakers also refuse to increase prices in response to increased demand. Several
bakers explained that they do not change prices during weekends (when more people shop at
bakeries), during the summer tourist season (again, when demand rises), or during the holiday
absences of local competitors (when demand andmarket power rise), because it would be unfair—
and hence anger and drive away customers.
4. Monopoly model
We extend a simple model of monopoly pricing to include fairness concerns and subproportional
inference, along the lines described in section 3. In this extended model, the markup charged by
the monopoly is lower. Furthermore, the markup responds to marginal-cost shocks, generating
some price rigidity: prices are not completely xed, but they respond less than one-for-one to
marginal costs.
4.1. Assumptions
Amonopoly sells a good to a representative customer. The monopoly cannot price-discriminate,
so each unit of good sells at the same price P . The customer cares about fairness and appraises
transactional fairness by assessing the markup charged by the monopoly. Since the customer
does not observe the marginal cost of production, she needs to infer it from the price. We assume
that the perceived marginal cost at price P is given by a belief functionCp(P). For simplicity, we
restrictCp(P) to be deterministic. Having inferred the marginal cost, the customer deduces that
the markup charged by the monopoly is
Mp(P) = P
Cp(P) .
The perceived markup determines the fairness of the transaction through a fairness function
F (Mp) > 0. Both functionsCp(P) and F (Mp) are assumed to be twice differentiable.
A customer who buys a quantity Y of the good at price P experiences the fairness-adjusted
consumption
Z = F (Mp(P)) · Y .
The customer also faces a budget constraint:
P · Y + B =W ,
whereW > 0 designates initial wealth, and B designates remaining money balances. Fairness-
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adjusted consumption and money balances enter a quasilinear utility function
ϵ
ϵ − 1 · Z
(ϵ−1)/ϵ + B,
where the parameter ϵ > 1 governs the concavity of the utility function. Given fairness factor F
and price P , the customer chooses purchasesY andmoney balances B to maximize utility subject
to the budget constraint.
Finally, the monopoly has constant marginal costC > 0. It chooses price P and outputY to
maximize prots (P −C) · Y subject to customers’ demand for its good.
4.2. Demand and pricing
We begin by determining customers’ demand for the monopoly good. The customer chooses
purchasesY to maximize utility
ϵ
ϵ − 1 (F · Y )
(ϵ−1)/ϵ +W − P · Y .
The customer’s utility function is strictly concave so the following rst-order condition gives its
global maximum:
F (ϵ−1)/ϵ · Y−1/ϵ = P .
This rst-order condition yields the demand curve
(1) Yd(P) = P−ϵ · F (Mp(P))ϵ−1.
The price affects demand through two channels: the typical substitution effect, captured by P−ϵ ;
and the fairness channel, captured by F (Mp(P))ϵ−1. The fairness channel appears because the
price inuences the perceivedmarkup and thus the fairness of the transaction; this in turn affects
the marginal utility of consumption and demand.
We turn to the monopoly’s pricing. The monopoly chooses price P to maximize prots (P −
C) · Yd(P). The rst-order condition is
Yd(P) + (P −C) dY
d
dP
= 0.
We introduce the price elasticity of demand, normalized to be positive:
E = −d ln
(
Yd
)
d ln(P) = −
P
Yd
· dY
d
dP
.
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The rst-order condition then yields the classical result that
P =
E
E − 1 ·C;
that is, the monopoly optimally sets its price at a markupM = E/(E − 1) over marginal cost.4
To learn more about the monopoly’s markup, we compute the elasticity E. Using (1), we nd
(2) E = ϵ + (ϵ − 1) · ϕ ·
[
1 − d ln(C
p)
d ln(P)
]
,
whereϕ = −d ln(F )/d ln(Mp) is the elasticity of the fairness functionwith respect to the perceived
markup, normalized to be positive. The rst term, ϵ , describes the standard substitution effect.
The second term, (ϵ − 1) ·ϕ · [1 − d ln(Cp)/d ln(P)], represents the fairness channel and splits into
two subterms. The rst subterm, (ϵ−1) ·ϕ, appears because a higher pricemechanically raises the
perceivedmarkup and thus reduces fairness. The second subterm,−(ϵ − 1) ·ϕ · [d ln(Cp)/d ln(P)],
appears because a higher price conveys information about the marginal cost and thus inuences
perceived markup and fairness. We now use (2) to compute the markup in various situations.
4.3. No fairness concerns
Before studying the more realistic case with fairness concerns, we examine the benchmark case
in which customers do not care about fairness.
Definition 1. Customers who do not care about fairness have a fairness function F (Mp) = 1.
Without fairness concerns, the fairness function is constant, so its elasticity is ϕ = 0. Ac-
cording to (2), the price elasticity of demand is therefore constant: E = ϵ . This implies that the
optimal markup for the monopoly takes a standard value of ϵ/(ϵ − 1).
Since the markup is independent of costs, changes in marginal cost are fully passed through
into the price; that is, prices are exible. Formally, the cost passthrough is
β =
d ln(P)
d ln(C) ,
which measures the percentage change in price when the marginal cost increases by 1%. The
passthrough takes the value of one because P = ϵ ·C/(ϵ − 1).
The following lemma summarizes the results:
4At this stage, we cannot guarantee that the rst-order condition identies the maximum of the monopoly’s prot
function. But in appendix A.1, we use the assumptions introduced in the next sections to verify that in all cases the
rst-order condition indeed gives the maximum of the prot function.
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Lemma 1. When customers do not care about fairness, the monopoly sets the markup to M =
ϵ/(ϵ − 1), and the cost passthrough is β = 1.
4.4. Fairness concerns and observable costs
We now introduce fairness concerns. As a preliminary step to the analysis with unobservable
costs, we explore pricing when costs are observable.
To describe fairness concerns, we impose some structure on the fairness function.
Definition 2. Customers who care about fairness have a fairness function F (Mp) that is positive,
strictly decreasing, and weakly concave on [0,Mh], where F (Mh) = 0 andMh > ϵ/(ϵ − 1).
The assumption that the fairness function strictly decreases in the perceivedmarkup captures
the pattern that customers nd higher markups less fair and resent unfair transactions. The
assumption that the fairness function is weakly concave means that an increase in perceived
markup causes a utility loss of equal magnitude (if F is linear) or of greater magnitude (if F is
strictly concave) than the utility gain caused by an equal-sized decrease in perceived markup.
We could not nd evidence on this assumption, but it seems natural that people are at least as
outraged over a price increase as they are happy about a price decrease of the same magnitude.
The assumptions about the fairness function lead to the following properties:
Lemma 2. When customers care about fairness, the elasticity of the fairness function
ϕ(Mp) = − d ln(F )
d ln(Mp)
is strictly positive and strictly increasing on (0,Mh), with limMp→0 ϕ(Mp) = 0 and limMp→Mh ϕ(Mp) =
+∞. As an implication, the superelasticity of the fairness function
σ =
d ln(ϕ)
d ln(Mp)
is strictly positive on (0,Mh).
Proof. By denition,ϕ(Mp) = −Mp ·F ′(Mp)/F (Mp). Using the properties of the fairness function
listed in denition 2, F (Mp) > 0 and F ′(Mp) < 0, so ϕ(Mp) > 0. The properties also indicate that
F > 0 is decreasing inMp, and that F ′ < 0 is decreasing inMp (as F is concave inMp). Thus,
both 1/F > 0 and −F ′ > 0 are increasing inMp, which implies that ϕ is strictly increasing inMp.
The properties also indicate that F (0) > 0 and F ′(0) is nite, so limMp→0 ϕ(Mp) = 0. Last, the
properties indicate that F (Mh) = 0whileMh > 0 and F ′(Mh) < 0, so that limMp→Mh ϕ(Mp) = +∞.
The nal result immediately follows, as σ = Mp ·ϕ′(Mp)/ϕ(Mp),ϕ′(Mp) > 0, andϕ(Mp) > 0. 
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A key property in the lemma is that the superelasticity of the fairness function is positive—
meaning that the fairness function is more elastic at higher perceived markups. This property
follows from the assumptions in denition 2 because a positive, decreasing, and weakly concave
function always has positive superelasticity. It will play a central role in the analysis.5
Since the marginal cost is assumed to be observable, customers correctly perceive marginal
cost (Cp = C), so the perceived markup equals the true markup (Mp = M). From (2), we see that
the price elasticity of demand is E = ϵ + (ϵ − 1) · ϕ(M) > ϵ; therefore, the markup charged by
the monopoly satises
(3) M = 1 +
1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + ϕ(M) .
Since ϕ(M) is strictly increasing from 0 to +∞ whenM increases from 0 toMh (lemma 2), the
right-hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing from ϵ/(ϵ − 1) to 1 whenM increases from 0
toMh > ϵ/(ϵ − 1) > 1. We infer that the xed-point equation (3) admits a unique solution, located
between 1 and ϵ/(ϵ − 1). Therefore, the markupM is well-dened andM ∈ (1, ϵ/(ϵ − 1)).
The next lemma records the results:
Lemma 3. When customers care about fairness and observe costs, the monopoly’s markup M is
implicitly dened by (3). This implies that M ∈ (1, ϵ/(ϵ − 1)) and the cost passthrough is β = 1.
Hence, the markup is lower than without fairness concerns, but the passthrough is identical.
Without fairness concerns, the price affects demand solely through customers’ budget sets.
With fairness concerns and observable marginal costs, the price also inuences the perceived
fairness of the transaction: when the price is high relative to marginal cost, customers deem
the transaction to be less fair, which reduces the marginal utility from consuming the good and
hence demand. Consequently, the monopoly’s demand is more price elastic than without fairness
concerns, which forces the monopoly to charge a lower markup.
However, (3) shows that with fairness concerns and observable costs, the markup does not
depend on costs, as in the absence of fairness concerns. Since changes in marginal cost do not
affect the markup, they are completely passed through into price: prices remain exible.
5The concavity of the fairness function is not a necessary condition for any of the results in the paper. The
necessary conditions are that the fairness function is decreasing in the perceived markup, and that its elasticity is
increasing in the perceived markup. The elasticity is increasing with weakly concave functions but also with other,
not-too-convex functions. For example, the logistic function F (Mp ) = 1/[1 + (Mp )θ ] with θ > 0 is not concave but it
is decreasing and has an increasing elasticity: ϕ(Mp ) = −d ln(F )/d ln(Mp ) = θ/[1 + (Mp )−θ ]. All the results would
carry over with such logistic fairness function. We limit ourselves to concave functions instead of allowing for any
function with an increasing elasticity because we nd such restriction more natural (it is a natural extension of a
linear function) and easier to interpret.
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4.5. Fairness concerns and rational inference of costs
Next, we combine fairness concerns with unobservable marginal costs. We study a last prelimi-
nary case: we assume that customers rationally invert the price to uncover the hidden marginal
cost. In this case, the model takes the form of a simple signaling game in which the monopoly
learns its marginal cost and chooses a price, before customers observe the monopoly’s price—but
not its marginal cost—and formulate demand. Let [0,Ch] ⊂ R+ be the set of all possible marginal
costs for the monopoly. The monopoly knows its marginal costC ∈ [0,Ch], but customers do not;
instead, customers have non-atomistic prior beliefs over [0,Ch].
A pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game comprises three elements:
a pure strategy for the monopolist, which is a mapping P : [0,Ch] → R+ that selects a price
for every possible value of marginal cost; a belief function for customers, which is a mapping
Cp : R+ → [0,Ch] that determines a marginal cost for every possible price; and a pure strategy
for customers, which is a mapping Yd : R+ → R+ that selects a quantity purchased for every
possible price.6
We look for a PBE that is fully separating: the monopoly chooses different prices for different
marginal costs, which allows a rational customer who knows themonopoly’s equilibrium strategy
and observes the price to deduce marginal cost.
We now demonstrate the existence of a PBE in which the monopolist uses the strategy P(C) =
ϵ ·C/(ϵ − 1); customers believeCp(P) = (ϵ − 1)P/ϵ if P ∈ P ≡ [0, ϵCh/(ϵ − 1)] , andCp(P) = 0
otherwise; and customers demand Yd(P) = P−ϵ · F (P/Cp(P))ϵ−1. In such a PBE, customers
correctly infer marginal costs from prices on the equilibrium path (P ∈ P), and they infer the
worst when they observe a price off the equilibrium path (P < P)—namely that the rm has zero
marginal cost and thus innitely high markup.
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, given their beliefs, customers’ strategy is indeed
optimal, as we have shown in (1). Second, given the monopolist’s strategy, customers’ beliefs
are indeed correct for any price on the equilibrium path. Third, given customers’ beliefs and
strategy, themonopolist’s strategy is optimal. Indeed, given customers’ beliefs for P ∈ P, we have
d ln(Cp)/d ln(P) = 1. Then, according to (2) (which is implied by customers’ strategy), the price
elasticity of demand for any price on P is E = ϵ . Hence, it is optimal for the monopolist to charge
a price P = ϵC/(ϵ − 1). It remains to show that the monopoly has no incentive to charge some
price not belonging to P. This is straightforward: if it does, customers infer that the markup is
innite, which brings fairness factor, demand, and thus prots to zero. Thus, the monopolist has
no incentive to deviate from the equilibriummarkup ϵ/(ϵ − 1), regardless of its marginal cost.
6Strictly speaking,Cp should allow the consumer to hold probabilistic beliefs about the rm’s marginal cost given
price, but we sidestep this subtlety because it does not affect our analysis.
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The following lemma records the ndings:
Lemma 4. When customers care about fairness and rationally infer costs, there is a PBE in which
the monopoly uses the markup M = ϵ/(ϵ − 1), and customers learn marginal cost from price. In
this PBE, the cost passthrough is β = 1. Hence, in this PBE, the markup and passthrough are the
same as without fairness concerns.
The lemma shows that when customers care about fairness and rationally infer costs, there is
a PBE in which fairness does not play a role. The intuition is the following. Without fairness con-
cerns, the price affects demand only by changing customers’ budget sets. With fairness concerns,
the price affects demand through a second channel, by changing the perceived markup. In this
equilibrium, however, aer observing any price chosen by the monopoly, rational customers
perceive the same markup ϵ/(ϵ − 1). The second channel closes, so the monopoly indeed sets
the standard markup ϵ/(ϵ − 1). Since the markup does not depend on marginal cost, changes in
marginal cost are fully passed through into prices—prices are exible again.
Of course, there may exist other equilibria beside the one described in lemma 4. An example
of a pooling PBE is one inwhich all types of the rm charge the same priceP > Ch, and consumers
believe that a rm who prices otherwise has zero marginal cost. However, this and other non-
fully-separating PBEs fail standard signaling renements.7 Because the linear PBE in lemma 4 is
so simple and robust, it is more plausible than any alternative, which suggests that fairness is
unlikely to matter when customers rationally infer costs.
4.6. Fairness concerns and subproportional inference of costs
We turn to the case of interest: customers care about fairness and subproportionally infer costs
from prices. In this case, the fairness function satises denition 2, and the belief function takes
the following form:
Definition 3. Customers who update subproportionally use the belief-updating rule
(4) Cp(P) =
(
Cb
)γ (ϵ − 1
ϵ
P
)1−γ
,
7Only a separating PBE satises the D1 Criterion from Cho and Kreps (1987). Intuitively, consumers ought to
interpret a price P ′ > P as coming from type C = Ch rather than type C = 0, which undermines the pooling
equilibrium. Indeed, if consumers demand no less at P ′ than in equilibrium, then all types of rm benet from
deviating; if consumers demand less at P ′ than in equilibrium, then the highest-cost rm strictly benets whenever
any other type of rm weakly benets. On these grounds, the D1 Criterion suggests that consumers should interpret
P ′ > P as coming from the highest marginal-cost rm.
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where Cb > (ϵ − 1) · (Mh)−1/γ · C/ϵ is a prior point belief about marginal cost, and γ ∈ (0, 1]
governs the extent to which beliefs anchor on that prior belief.
We have seen evidence that people do not sufciently introspect about the relationship
between price and marginal cost, which leads them to underinfer the information conveyed
by the price, and that they tend to think proportionally. The inference rule (4) geometrically
averages no inference with proportional inference, so it encompasses these two types of error.8
First, customers underinfer marginal costs from price by clinging to their prior beliefCb . The
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1]measures the degree of such underinference. When γ = 1, customers do
not update at all about marginal cost based on price; they naively maintain their prior beliefCb ,
irrespective of the price they observe. When γ ∈ (0, 1), customers do infer something from the
price, but not enough.
Moreover, insofar as they infer something, they infer that marginal cost is proportional to
price, given by (ϵ −1)P/ϵ . Such proportional inference represents a second error: underinference
pertains to howmuch customers infer, whereas proportional inference describes what customers
infer in as much as they do infer. The updating rule has the property that in the limit as γ = 0,
customers infer rationally. Indeed, whenγ = 0, themonopoly optimally sets themarkup ϵ/(ϵ−1),
which makes (ϵ − 1)P/ϵ the marginal cost at price P , and proportional inference agrees with
rational inference. When γ ∈ (0, 1), however, the monopoly does not nd it optimal to mark up
proportionally, and proportional inference becomes an error.
Last, we impose a constraint on the parameterCb such that the perceived markup falls below
Mh when the rm prices at marginal cost; this is necessary for the equilibrium to exist.
Despite its apparent arbitrary nature, the assumption of subproportional inference has close
ties to game-theoretic models of failure of contingent thinking. It is related to the concept of
cursed equilibrium, developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005), and to the concept of analogy-based
expectation equilibrium, developed by Jehiel (2005) and extended to Bayesian games by Jehiel and
Koessler (2008). Both concepts proposemechanisms that can be used to explain why peoplemight
fail to account for the information that equilibrium prices reveal about marginal costs.9 Subpro-
portional inference is also related to the cursed-expectation equilibrium developed by Eyster,
Rabin, and Vayanos (2019) as an alternative to rational-expectations equilibrium in markets.10
8We use a geometric average instead of an arithmetic average because it is much more tractable.
9In fact, with γ = 1, the beliefs about marginal cost given by (4) resemble those in a fully cursed equilibrium and
the coarsest analogy-based-expectation equilibrium, when recasting our model as a Bayesian game, as in section 4.5.
In these equilibrium concepts, an unsophisticated household infers nothing about marginal cost from any economic
variable. Consequently, a consumer with average prior beliefs about marginal cost equal toCb would continue to
perceive marginal costs with meanCb given any price.
10In a cursed-expectation equilibrium of a model in which traders endowed with private information trade a risky
asset, each trader forms an expectation about the value of the asset equal to a geometric average of her expectation
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Our assumption of subproportional inference is also related to several well-documented
psychological biases. Customers in our model are coarse thinkers in the sense of Mullainathan,
Schwartzstein, and Shleifer (2008) because they do not distinguish between scenarios where
price changes reect changes in cost and those where they reect changes in markup. The
underinference could also be a form of the anchoring heuristic documented by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974): consumers understand that higher prices reect higher marginal costs but
do not adjust sufciently their estimate of the marginal cost. It might also embody a form of
the availability heuristic documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1973): people make inferences
by drawing upon a limited set of scenarios that come to mind; higher prices suggest increased
markups and greed, rather than higher marginal costs. Altogether, the updating rule (4) captures
a well-known bias: people do not update their beliefs sufciently from available information.
Analytical results. Plugging the belief-updating rule (4) intoMp = P/Cp, we obtain the follow-
ing:
Lemma 5. When customers update subproportionally, they perceive the monopoly’s markup to be
Mp(P) =
( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ ( P
Cb
)γ
,
which is a strictly increasing function of the observed price P .
Customers appreciate that higher prices signal higher marginal costs. But by underappre-
ciating the strength of the relationship between price and marginal cost, customers partially
misattribute higher prices to higher markups. Consequently, they regard higher prices as less
fair. As the functionsMp(P) and F (Mp) are differentiable, customers enjoy an innitesimal price
reduction as much as they dislike an innitesimal price increase; therefore, the monopoly’s
demand curve has no kinks, unlike in pricing theories based on loss aversion (Heidhues and
Koszegi 2008).
Combining (2) and (4), we then nd that the price elasticity of demand satises
E = ϵ + (ϵ − 1) · γ · ϕ(Mp).
conditional upon her private signal alone and her expectation conditional upon both her private signal and the
market price. Traders’ expectations therefore take the form of a weighted average of naive beliefs and correct
beliefs. The two rules differ in that consumers in our model average naive beliefs with a particular form of incorrect
beliefs (proportional inference); to include rational updating as a limit case, we calibrate the updating rule to match
correct equilibrium beliefs for the case in which all consumers are rational. We adopt this approach for its analytic
tractability and suspect that the main results of the paper would go through if people averaged their prior beliefs
with rational beliefs about cost.
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We have seen that without fairness concerns (ϕ = 0), or with rational inference (γ = 0), the price
elasticity of demand is constant, equal to ϵ. That result changes here. Since γ > 0, the price
elasticity of demand is always greater than ϵ. Moreover, since ϕ(Mp) is increasing inMp and
Mp(P) in P , the price elasticity of demand is increasing in P . These properties have implications
for the markup charged by the monopoly,M = E/(1 − E).
Proposition 1. When customers care about fairness and update subproportionally, themonopoly’s
markup is implicitly dened by
(5) M = 1 +
1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + γϕ(Mp(M ·C)) ,
which implies thatM ∈ (1, ϵ/(ϵ − 1)). Furthermore, the cost passthrough is given by
β = 1
/ {
1 +
γ 2ϕσ
(1 + γϕ) [ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ]
}
,
which implies that β ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the markup is lower than without fairness concerns or
with rational inference; and unlike without fairness concerns or with rational inference, the cost
passthrough is incomplete.
The proof is relegated to appendix A.2, but the intuition is simple. First, when customers
care about fairness but underinfer marginal costs, they become more price-sensitive. Indeed,
an increase in the price increases the opportunity cost of consumption—as in the case without
fairness—and also increases the perceived markup, which reduces the marginal utility of con-
sumption and therefore demand. This heightened price-sensitivity raises the price elasticity of
demand above ϵ and pushes the markup below ϵ/(ϵ − 1).
Second, aer an increase in marginal cost, the monopoly optimally lowers its markup. This
occurs because customers underappreciate the increase in marginal cost that accompanies a
higher price. Since the perceived markup increases, the price elasticity of demand increases. In
response, the monopoly reduces its markup, which mitigates the price increase. Thus, our model
generates incomplete passthrough of marginal cost into price—a mild form of price rigidity.
Furthermore, customers err in believing that transactions are less fair when the marginal cost
increases: transactions actually become more fair.
Comparison with microevidence. The result that prices do not fully respond to marginal-cost
shocks accords well with evidence on real rm behavior. First, using matched data on prod-
uct prices and producers’ unit labor cost in Sweden, Carlsson and Skans (2012) nd a limited
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passthrough of idiosyncratic marginal-cost changes into prices of about 0.3. Second, using pro-
duction data for Indian manufacturing rms, De Loecker et al. (2016, table 7) nd that following
trade liberalization in India, marginal costs fell signicantly due to the import tariff reduction,
yet prices failed to fall in step: they estimate passthroughs between 0.3 and 0.4. Third, using
production and cost data for Mexican manufacturing rms, Caselli, Chatterjee, and Woodland
(2017, table 7) also nd a modest passthrough of idiosyncratic marginal-cost changes into prices:
between 0.2 and 0.4. Last, combining production data for US manufacturing rms with data
on energy prices and consumption, Ganapati, Shapiro, and Walker (2019, tables 5 and 6) nd a
moderate passthrough of marginal-cost changes caused by energy-price variations into prices:
between 0.5 and 0.7. Taking the midpoint estimates from the four studies, we nd an average
passthrough of 0.3+ (0.3+ 0.4)/2+ (0.2+ 0.4)/2+ (0.5+ 0.7)/2 = 0.4. Hence, across studies, the
cost passthrough is well below 1.
Additionally, our theory predicts that when customers care about fairness, the passthrough
of marginal costs into prices is markedly different when costs are observable and when they are
not. The passthrough is one when costs are observable (lemma 3) but is strictly below one when
costs are not observable (proposition 1). Kachelmeier, Limberg, and Schadewald (1991a,b) and
Renner and Tyran (2004) provide experimental evidence consistent with this result: they nd that
aer a cost shock, prices adjust much more when costs are observable than when they are not.
Comparison with the literature. In our model, price rigidity arises from a nonconstant price
elasticity of demand, which creates variations in markups aer cost shocks. In that respect,
our model shares similarities to other models in which a variable price elasticity leads to price
rigidity. In international economics, these models have long been used to explain the behavior
of exchange rates and prices (Dornbusch 1985; Bergin and Feenstra 2001; Atkeson and Burstein
2008). In macroeconomics, such models have been used to create real rigidities—in the sense
of Ball and Romer (1990)—that amplify nominal rigidities (Kimball 1995; Dotsey and King 2005;
Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007). Whereas many of these models make reduced-form assumptions
(in the utility function or the demand curve) to generate a nonconstant price elasticity of demand,
our model provides a microfoundation for this property.
Additional analytical results. To obtain further results, we introduce a simple fairness function
that satises all the requirements from denition 2:
(6) F (Mp) = 1 − θ ·
(
Mp − ϵ
ϵ − 1
)
,
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where θ > 0 governs the intensity of fairness concerns. A higher θ means that a consumer
grows more upset when consuming an overpriced item and more content when consuming an
underpriced item. The fairness function reaches 1 when the perceived markup equals ϵ/(ϵ − 1);
then fairness-adjusted consumption coincides with actual consumption. When the perceived
markup exceeds ϵ/(ϵ − 1), the fairness function falls below one; and when the perceived markup
lies below ϵ/(ϵ − 1), the fairness function surpasses one.
Furthermore, to compare different industries or economies, we focus on a situation in which
customers have acclimated to prices by coming to judge rms’ markups as acceptable:Cb adjusts
soMp = ϵ/(ϵ − 1) and F = 1. Acclimation is likely to occur eventually within any industry or
economy, once customers have faced the same prices for a long time.11
We then obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Assume that customers care about fairness according to the fairness function (6),
infer subproportionally, and are acclimated. Then the monopoly’s markup is given by
M = 1 +
1
(1 + γθ ) ϵ − 1 .
The markup decreases with the competitiveness of the market (ϵ), concern for fairness (θ ), and
degree of underinference (γ ). And the cost passthrough is given by
β = 1
/ {
1 +
γ 2θ [(1 + θ ) ϵ − 1]
(ϵ − 1) (1 + γθ ) [(1 + γθ ) ϵ − 1]
}
.
The passthrough increases with the competitiveness of the market (ϵ), but decreases with the
concern for fairness (θ ) and degree of underinference (γ ).
The proof is in appendix A.3; it involves applying proposition 1 to the fairness function (6),
under acclimation.
Comparison with additional microevidence. Our theory predicts that the cost passthrough is
higher in more-competitive markets.12 This property echoes the nding by Carlton (1986) that
prices are less rigid in less-concentrated industries. It is also consistent with the nding by Amiti,
11As noted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, p. 730), “Psychological studies of adaption suggest that any
stable state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer come to
mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of a reference transaction. . . .
[People] adapt their views of fairness to the norms of actual behavior.” The belief-updating rule (7) introduced in the
New Keynesian model has the property that for any initial belief, people eventually become acclimated.
12Fairness operates by reducing themarkup below its standard level ϵ/(ϵ − 1) and toward 1. As themarket becomes
perfectly competitive, the markup approaches 1, and prices become exible (see proposition 1 when ϵ →∞).
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Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) that rms with higher market power have a lower passthrough of
cost shocks driven by exchange-rate uctuations.
Our theory also predicts that the passthrough is lower—so prices are more rigid—in markets
that are more fairness-oriented. This property could contribute to explain the nding by Kack-
meister (2007) that retail prices were more rigid in 1889–1891 than in 1997–1999. Kackmeister
emphasizes that the relationship between retailers and customers wasmuchmore personal in the
19th century than today.13 Thismore personal relationship could havemade the retail sectormore
fairness-oriented, which would help to explain, according to our theory, greater price rigidity
in the past. The property that prices are more rigid in markets that are more fairness-oriented
could also contribute to explain the nding by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, table 8) that prices
are more rigid in the service sector than elsewhere. Indeed, in the service sector, relationships
between buyers and sellers are more personal, which could make fairness concerns more salient
and thus prices more rigid.
5. New Keynesianmodel
We now explore the macroeconomic implications of the pricing theory developed in section 4. To
that end, we embed it into a NewKeynesianmodel as a substitute for usual pricing frictions (either
Calvo 1983 pricing or Rotemberg 1982 pricing). We nd that when customers care about fairness
and infer subproportionally, the price markup depends on the rate of ination; thus, monetary
policy is nonneutral in both short and long run. (All derivations are relegated to appendix B.)
5.1. Assumptions
The economy is composed of a continuum of rms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of
households indexed by k ∈ [0, 1]. Firms use labor services to produce goods. Households supply
labor services, consume goods, and save using riskless nominal bonds. Since goods are imperfect
substitutes for one another, and labor services are also imperfect substitutes, each rm exercises
some monopoly power on the goods market, and each household exercises some monopoly
power on the labor market.
Fairness concerns. Households cannot observe rms’ marginal costs. When a household pur-
chases good j at price Pj(t) in period t , it infers that rm j ’s marginal cost isCpj (t). The dynamic
13Kackmeister notes: “In 1889–1891 retailing oen occurred in small one- or two-person shops, retailers supplied
credit to the customers, and retailers usually delivered the purchases to the customer’s home at no extra charge.
Today retailing occurs in large stores, a third party supplies credit, and the customer takes his own items home. These
changes decrease both the business and personal relationship between the retailer and the customer” (p. 2008).
24
model provides a natural candidate for the anchor that households use when inferring costs: last
period’s perception of marginal cost. Hence, instead of being given by (4) as in the static model,
households’ perception of rm j ’s marginal cost at time t is given by
(7) Cpj (t) =
[
C
p
j (t − 1)
]γ [ϵ − 1
ϵ
Pj(t)
] 1−γ
,
where Cpj (t − 1) is last period’s perception of marginal cost, and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of
underinference.
Having inferred the marginal cost, the household deduces that the markup charged by rm j
isMpj (t) = Pj(t)/Cpj (t). This perceived markup determines the fairness of the transaction with
rm j, measured by Fj(Mpj (t)). The fairness function Fj , specic to good j, satises the conditions
listed in denition 2. The elasticity of Fj with respect toM
p
j is ϕj = −d ln(Fj)/d ln(Mpj ).
An amountYjk(t) of good j bought by householdk at a unit pricePj(t) yields a fairness-adjusted
consumption
Zjk(t) = Fj(Mpj (Pj(t))) · Yjk(t).
Household k ’s fairness-adjusted consumption of the different goods aggregates into a consump-
tion index
Zk(t) =
[∫ 1
0
Zjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dj
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)
,
where ϵ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The price of one unit of the
consumption index at time t is given by the price index
X (t) =
{∫ 1
0
[
Pj(t)
Fj(Mpj (Pj(t)))
] 1−ϵ
dj
}1/(1−ϵ)
.
Households. Household k derives utility from consuming goods and disutility from working. Its
expected lifetime utility takes the form of
E0
∞∑
t=0
δ t
[
ln(Zk(t)) − Nk(t)
1+η
1 + η
]
,
where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional upon time-t information, Nk(t) is its labor
supply, δ ∈ (0, 1) is its time discount factor, and η > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply.
To smooth consumption over time, households trade one-period bonds. In period t , house-
hold k holds Bk(t) bonds. Bonds purchased in period t have a priceQ(t), mature in period t + 1,
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and pay one unit of money at maturity.
Household k ’s consumption-savings decisions in each period t must obey the constraint∫ 1
0
Pj(t)Yjk(t)dj +Q(t)Bk(t) =Wk(t)Nk(t) + Bk(t − 1) +Vk(t),
whereWk(t) is the wage rate for labor service k, andVk(t) are dividends from rm ownership. In
addition, household k satises a solvency constraint that prevents Ponzi schemes.
Finally, in each period t , householdk chooses purchasesYjk(t) for each j ∈ [0, 1], labor supply
Nk(t), bond holdings Bk(t), and wage rateWk(t). The household’s objective is to maximize its
expected utility subject to the budget constraint, to the solvency constraint, and to rms’ demand
for labor service k. The household takes as given its initial endowment of bonds Bk(−1), all
fairness factors Fj(t), all prices Pj(t) andQ(t), and dividendsVk(t).
Firms. Firm j hires labor to produce output using the production function
(8) Yj(t) = Aj(t)Nj(t)α ,
where Yj(t) is output of good j, Aj(t) > 0 is its technology level, α ∈ (0, 1] is the extent of
diminishing marginal returns to labor, and
Nj(t) =
[∫ 1
0
Njk(t)(ν−1)/ν dk
]ν/(ν−1)
is an employment index. In the index,Njk(t) is the quantity of labor service k hired by rm j, and
ν > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different labor services. The technology levelAj(t)
is stochastic and unobservable to households—making the rm’s marginal cost unobservable.
Each period t , rm j chooses outputYj(t), price Pj(t), and employment levels Njk(t) for all
k ∈ [0, 1]. The rm’s objective is to maximize the expected present-discounted value of prots
E0
∞∑
t=0
Γ (t)
[
Pj(t)Yj(t) −
∫ 1
0
Wk(t)Njk(t)dk
]
,
where Γ (t) = δ t [X (0)Z (0)]/[X (t)Z (t)] is the stochastic discount factor for period-t nominal
payoffs, subject to the production constraint (8), to the demand for good j, and to the law of
motion of the perceived marginal cost (7). The rm takes as given the initial belief about its
marginal cost Cpj (−1), all wage ratesWk(t), and discount factors Γ (t). The rm’s prots are
rebated to households as dividends.
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Monetary policy. We dene the ination rate between t and t + 1 as pi (t + 1) = ln(P(t + 1)/P(t)),
the nominal interest between t and t + 1 as i(t) = − ln(Q(t)), and the real interest rate as
r (t) = i(t) − pi (t). The nominal interest rate is determined by a simple monetary-policy rule:
(9) i(t) = i0(t) +ψpi (t),
where i0(t) is stochastic, andψ > 1 governs the response of interest rates to ination.
Symmetry. We assume a symmetric economy: all households receive the same initial bond
endowment and same dividends; and all rms share a common technology and face the same
fairness and belief functions. Hence, all households behave identically, as do all rms.
Notation. Since the equilibrium is symmetric, we drop subscripts j and k to denote the equilib-
rium values taken by the variables. We also denote the steady-state value of any variableH (t) by
H . And for any variableH (t) except the interest and ination rates, we denote the logarithmic
deviation from steady state by ĥ(t) ≡ ln(H (t)) − ln(H ). For the interest and ination rates, we
denote the deviation from steady state by pi (t) ≡ pi (t) − pi , î0(t) ≡ i0(t) − i0, and r̂ (t) ≡ r (t) − r .
5.2. Demand for goods and pricing
Households and rms behave exactly as in the textbook model, except that fairness concerns
modify consumers’ demand and, consequently, rms’ pricing.
The demand for good j from all households is
Ydj
(
t , Pj(t),Cpj (t − 1)
)
= Z (t)
[
Pj(t)
X (t)
]−ϵ
Fj
(( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ [ Pj(t)
C
p
j (t − 1)
]γ )ϵ−1
,
where Z (t) =
∫ 1
0 Zk(t)dk describes the level of aggregate demand.14 The price of good j appears
twice in the demand curve: as part of the relative price Pj/X , as in the textbook model; and as
part of the fairness factor Fj(·). This second element leads to unconventional pricing.
Once again, fairness affects pricing through the price elasticity of demand. As in the static
14The equation can be rewritten in the standard form of this type of model: Zdj ≡ Fj · Ydj = Z · [(Pj/Fj )/X ]−ϵ . As
the price of one unit of Z j is Pj/Fj and the price of one unit of Z isX , the relative price of Z j is (Pj/Fj )/X . Hence,
the demand for Z j equals aggregate demand Z times the relative price of Z j to the power of −ϵ .
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model, this elasticity is a function of the perceived price markup:
Ej(Mpj (t)) = −
∂ ln
(
Ydj
)
∂ ln
(
Pj
) = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕj(Mpj (t)).
Unlike in the staticmodel, however, the prot-maximizingmarkup does not equal Ej(t)/[Ej(t)−1]
because the price elasticity of demand does not capture the effect of the current price on future
perceived marginal costs and thus future demands. Instead, in equilibrium, rms set their price
markupM(t) such that
(10)
M(t) − 1
M(t) E(M
p(t)) = 1 − δγ + δ Et
(
M(t + 1) − 1
M(t + 1)
[
E(Mp(t + 1)) − (1 − γ )ϵ ] ) .
The gap betweenM(t) and E(t)/[E(t)− 1] reects howmuch today’s price affects future perceived
marginal costs, demand, and prots. Conversely, if rms do not care about the future (δ = 0),
then the equation reduces toM(t) = E(t)/[E(t) − 1], as in the static model.
The price markup plays an important role because it directly determines employment:
(11) N (t) =
[ (ν − 1)α
ν
· 1
M(t)
] 1/(1+η)
.
This equation shows that in equilibrium employment is strictly decreasing in the price markup.
This is because in equilibrium the price markup is the inverse of the real marginal cost, which is
itself increasing in employment.15 Since a lower price markup implies a higher real marginal
cost, it also implies higher employment.
5.3. Calibration
Before simulating themodel, we calibrate it to US data. To set values of the fairness-related param-
eters, we use new evidence on price markups and cost passthroughs. For the other parameters,
we rely on standard evidence. The calibrated values of the parameters are summarized in table 4.
Fairness function. We set the shape of the fairness function F to (6). This simple functional
form has two advantages. First, it introduces only one new parameter, θ > 0, which governs
the concern for fairness. Second, it produces a fairness factor equal to one at the zero-ination
15The real marginal cost is the ratio of real wage to marginal product of labor. The marginal product of labor is
decreasing in employment because of diminishing returns. Simultaneously, the real wage is proportional to the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, which is increasing in employment because the
utility function is concave and because more employment means more consumption but less leisure.
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Table 4. Parameter values in simulations
Value Description Source or target
A. Common parameters
δ = 0.99 Quarterly discount factor Annual rate of return = 4%
α = 1 Marginal returns to labor Labor share = 2/3
η = 1.1 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply Chetty et al. (2013, table 2)
ψ = 1.5 Response of nominal interest rate to ination Gali (2008, p. 52)
µi = 3/4 Persistence of interest-rate shock Gali (2008, p. 52), Gali (2011, p. 26)
µa = 0.9 Persistence of technology shock Gali (2008, p. 55)
B. Parameters of the New Keynesian model with fairness
ϵ = 2.2 Elasticity of substitution across goods Steady-state price markup = 1.5
θ = 9 Fairness concern Instantaneous cost passthrough = 0.4
γ = 0.8 Degree of underinference Two-year cost passthrough = 0.7
C. Parameters of the textbook New Keynesian model
ϵ = 3 Elasticity of substitution across goods Steady-state price markup = 1.5
ξ = 2/3 Share of rms keeping price unchanged Average price duration = 3 quarters
steady state. Indeed, in such steady state, the perceived price markup isMp = P/Cp = ϵ/(ϵ − 1)
(see equation (7)), and so the fairness factor is F = 1. Thus, with no trend ination, customers
acclimate and are neither happy nor unhappy about markups.
Fairness-related parameters. We then calibrate the three parameters central to our theory: the
fairness parameter θ , the inference parameter γ , and the elasticity of substitution across goods ϵ .
These parameters jointly determine the average value of the price markup and its response to
shocks—which determines the cost passthrough. Hence, for the calibration, we match evidence
on price markups and cost passthroughs. We target three empirical moments: average price
markup, short-run cost passthrough, and long-run cost passthrough.
First, using rm-level data, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) estimate price markups in the
United States between 1950 and 2014. They nd that the average markup hovers between 1.2 and
1.3 in the 1950–1980 period and rises from 1.2 to 1.7 in the 1980–2014 period. Since the average
markup since 2000 is about 1.5, we adopt this value as a target.16
16The average markup computed by De Loecker and Eeckhout is commensurate to the markups estimated for
specic industries or goods in the United States. In the automobile industry, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995,
p. 882) estimate that on average (P −C)/P = 0.239, which translates into a markup ofM = P/C = 1/(1− 0.239) = 1.3.
In the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Nevo (2001, table 8) nds that a median estimate of (P −C)/P is 0.372, which
translate into amarkup ofM = P/C = 1/(1− 0.372) = 1.6. In the coffee industry, Nakamura and Zerom (2010, table 6)
also estimate a markup of 1.6. For most national-brand items retailed in supermarkets, Barsky et al. (2003, p. 166)
discover that markups range between 1.4 and 2.1. Finally, earlier work surveyed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995,
pp. 260–267) estimates similar markups: the industrial-organization literature estimates markups to be between 1.2
and 1.7, and the marketing literature estimates a typical markup to be around 2.
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Second, we reported in section 4.6 that in the United States, Sweden, India, and Mexico, the
short-run cost passthrough is estimated between 0.2 and 0.7, with an average value of 0.4. Hence,
we target a short-run cost passthrough of 0.4.
Third, although we have not found long-run estimates for the cost passthrough, Burstein
and Gopinath (2014, table 7.4) provide long-run estimates of the exchange-rate passthrough for
the United States and seven other countries. This passthrough measures the response of import
prices to exchange-rate shocks. Its level may not reect the level of the cost passthrough because
marginal costs may not vary one-for-one with exchange rates (Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2014),
but there is no reason for the two passthroughs to have different dynamics. The immediate
exchange-rate passthrough is estimated around 0.4, and the two-year passthrough around 0.7.
Based on these dynamics, and the fact that the immediate cost passthrough is also 0.4, we target a
two-year cost passthrough of 0.7.
We then take the perspective of a rm in the model, and simulate price dynamics in response
to an unexpected and permanent increase in the rm’s marginal cost (appendix B.5). We nd that
the fairness parameter θ primarily affects the level of the cost passthrough, while the inference
parameterγ primarily affects its persistence. Based on the simulations, we set ϵ = 2.2, θ = 9, and
γ = 0.8. This calibration allows us to achieve a steady-state price markup of 1.5, an instantaneous
cost passthrough of 0.4, and a two-year cost passthrough of 0.7.
Other parameters. We set the labor-supply parameter to η = 1.1, which gives a Frisch elasticity
of labor supply of 1/1.1 = 0.9. This value is the median microestimate of the Frisch elasticity for
aggregate hours (Chetty et al. 2013, table 2). We then set the quarterly discount factor to δ = 0.99,
giving an annual rate of return on bonds of 4%. We set the production-function parameter to
α = 1. This calibration guarantees that the labor share, which equals α/M in steady state, takes
its conventional value of 2/3. Last, we calibrate the monetary-policy parameter toψ = 1.5, which
is consistent with observed variations in the federal funds rate (Gali 2008, p. 52).
Parameters of the textbook New Keynesian model. We also calibrate a textbook New Keynesian
model (described in appendix C), which we will use as a benchmark in simulations. For the
parameters common to the two models, we use the same values—except for ϵ. In the textbook
model, the steady-state price markup is ϵ/(ϵ − 1), so we set ϵ = 3 to obtain a markup of 1.5.
We also need to calibrate a parameter specic to the textbook model, ξ , which governs price
rigidity. To generate price rigidity, the New Keynesian literature uses either the staggered pricing
of Calvo (1983) or the price-adjustment cost of Rotemberg (1982). Both pricing assumptions lead
to the same linearized Phillips curve around the zero-ination steady state, and therefore to the
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same simulations (Roberts 1995). For calibration purposes, however, the Calvo interpretation of
ξ is easier to map to the data, so we use it here. The parameter ξ indicates the share of rms that
cannot update their prices each period; it can be calibrated frommicroevidence on the frequency
of price adjustments. If a share ξ of rms keep their price xed each period, the average duration
of a price spell is 1/(1 − ξ ) (Gali 2008, p. 43). In the microdata underlying the US Consumer
Price Index, the mean duration of price spells is about 3 quarters (Nakamura and Steinsson 2013,
table 1). Hence, we set 1/(1 − ξ ) = 3, which implies ξ = 2/3.
5.4. Effects of monetary policy in the short run
Price rigidity is a central concept in macroeconomic theory because it is a source of monetary
nonneutrality. Here we explore how our pricing theory produces monetary nonneutrality.
At this stage,we focus on the short-run effects ofmonetary policy.We trace howanunexpected
and transitory shock to monetary policy permeates through the economy.
Analytical results. The dynamics of the textbookmodel around the steady state are governed by
an IS equation, describing households’ consumption-savings decisions, and a short-run Phillips
curve, describing rms’ pricing decisions. In the model with fairness, the same IS equation
remains valid, but the Phillips curve is modied—because rms price differently.17
The main difference is that the Phillips curve involves not only employment and ination but
also the perceived price markup, which itself obeys the following law of motion:
Lemma 6. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the perceived price markup evolves accord-
ing to
(12) m̂p(t) = γ
[
pi (t) + m̂p(t − 1)
]
.
Accordingly, the perceived price markup is a discounted sum of lagged ination terms:
m̂p(t) =
∞∑
s=0
γ s+1pi (t − s).
17Introducing fairness concerns into the New Keynesian model improves the realism of the Phillips curve but not
that of the IS equation. Yet the IS equation is also problematic. It is notably the source of the many anomalies of
the New Keynesian model at the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Other behavioral elements have been
introduced into the New Keynesian model to improve the realism of the IS equation. For instance, Gabaix (2016)
assumes that households are inattentive to unusual events. Alternatively, Michaillat and Saez (2019) assume that
households derive utility not only from consumption and leisure but also from social status, which is measured by
relative wealth.
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The proof is in appendix B.4; it is obtained by reworking the inference rule (7).
Equation (12) shows that the perceived price markup today tends to be high if ination is high
or if the past perceived markup was high. Past beliefs matter because people use them as a basis
for their current beliefs. Ination matters because people do not fully appreciate the effect of
ination on nominal marginal costs. Because of its autoregressive structure, the perceived price
markup is fully determined by past ination.
As a result, the short-run Phillips curve involves not only forward-looking elements—expected
future ination and employment—but also backward-looking elements—past ination.
Proposition 2. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the short-run Phillips curve is
(13) (1 − δγ )m̂p(t) − λ1n̂(t) = δγ Et (pi (t + 1)) − λ2 Et (n̂(t + 1)),
where
λ1 ≡ (1 + η)ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ
γϕσ
[
1 +
(1 − δ )γ
1 − δγ ϕ
]
λ2 ≡ (1 + η)δ ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ
ϕσ
[
1 +
(1 − δ )γ
1 − δγ ϕ
]
.
Hence the short-run Phillips curve is hybrid, including both past and future ination rates:
(1 − δγ )
∞∑
s=0
γ s+1pi (t − s) − λ1n̂(t) = δγ Et (pi (t + 1)) − λ2 Et (n̂(t + 1)).
The proof appears in appendix B.4. It is obtained by log-linearizing rms’ pricing equation (10)
around the steady state, and combining it with the log-linear version of (11)—to link the price
markup to employment—and with (12)—to link the future perceived price markup to ination.
Simulation results. Next we simulate the dynamical response of our calibrated model to an
unexpected and transitory monetary shock. Following the literature, we simulate dynamics
around the zero-ination steady state. We assume that the exogenous component i0(t) of the
monetary-policy rule (9) follows an AR(1) process, such that
î0(t) = µi · î0(t − 1) + ζ i(t),
where the disturbance ζ i(t) follows a white-noise process with mean zero, and µi ∈ (0, 1) governs
the persistence of shocks. We set µi = 3/4, which corresponds to moderate persistence (Gali 2008,
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p. 52; Gali 2011, p. 26), and we simulate the response to an initial disturbance of ζ i(0) = −0.25%.
A negative realization of ζ i(t) is an expansionary monetary shock, leading to a fall in the real
interest rate.Without any ination response, this shockwould lead to a decrease of the annualized
interest rate by 1 percentage point.
Figure 1 depicts the dynamical response to the expansionarymonetary shock. The real-interest
and ination rates are expressed as deviations from steady-state values, measured in percentage
points and annualized (by multiplying by four the variables r̂ (t) and pi (t)); all other variables are
expressed as percentage deviations from steady-state values.
Loosening monetary policy generates a decrease in the real interest rate and an increase in
ination. Ination is positive for two quarters and close to zero thereaer. Observing higher prices,
customers underinfer the underlying increase in nominalmarginal costs and thus perceive higher
price markups. Firms respond to higher perceived markups by cutting their actual markups.
The price markup falls by 1.4%, which raises output and employment by 0.7%. (Output and
employment respond identically because the production function is calibrated to be linear.)
Comparison with microevidence. The dynamics of the perceived price markup in the model
allow us to make sense of the survey responses collected by Shiller (1997) and the Bank of Japan
(table 1). When consumers observe ination, they mistakenly believe that price markups are
higher and transactions are less fair, which lowers their consumption utility and triggers a feeling
of displeasure. Conversely, upon observing deation, they would believe that markups are lower
and transactions more fair, which would boost their consumption utility and trigger a feeling of
happiness. Hence, our model naturally explains why Japanese customers have a negative opinion
of ination and a positive opinion of deation. By the same token, it explains Shiller’s nding
that people are angered by ination, which they attribute to the greed of businesses.
Comparison with macroevidence. Monetary policy is nonneutral in the model because mon-
etary shocks inuence output and employment. The nonneutrality of monetary policy is well
documented; the evidence is summarized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) and
Ramey (2016, sec. 3). Furthermore, the effect of monetary policy is mediated by a hybrid Phillips
curve, which is realistic as both past ination and expected future ination enter signicantly in
estimated New Keynesian Phillips curve (Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Moller, and Stock 2014, table 2).
In fact the response of output to a monetary shock is broadly the same in the model as in US
data. First, the shape of the response is similar, as output is estimated to respond to monetary
shocks in a hump-shaped fashion (Ramey 2016, gs. 1–4). Second, the amplitude of the response
is comparable. Aer a one-percentage-point decrease of the nominal interest rate, the literature
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Figure 1. Effects of an expansionary monetary shock
This gure describes the response of the New Keynesian model with fairness (solid, blue lines) to a decrease in
the exogenous component of the monetary-policy rule (9) by 1 percentage point (annualized) at time 0. The real
interest rate and ination rate are deviations from steady state, measured in percentage points and annualized. The
other variables are percentage deviations from steady state. For comparison, the gure also displays the response of
the textbook New Keynesian model (dashed, orange lines). The log-linearized equilibrium conditions used in the
simulation of the model with fairness are described in appendix B.4; those used in the simulation of the textbook
model are in appendix C. The calibration of the two models is described in table 4.
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estimates that output increases between 0.6% and 5%, with a median value of 1.6% (Ramey 2016,
table 1); and using a range of methods and samples, Ramey (2016, table 2) estimates that output
increases between 0.2% and 2.2%, with a median value of 0.8%. In our simulation, output rises by
0.7% when the exogenous component of monetary policy increases by 1 percentage point—close
to Ramey’s median estimate.
Aer amonetary shock, pricemarkup and outputmove in opposite directions; the samewould
be true with other aggregate-demand shocks. At the same time, Gali (1999) and Basu, Fernald, and
Kimball (2006) have shown that aggregate-demand shocks explain the majority of business-cycle
uctuations. Accordingly, our model predicts that price markups are countercyclical. And indeed,
much of the evidence points to countercyclical price markups (Rotemberg and Woodford 1999;
Bils, Klenow, and Malin 2018).
The main discrepancy between our model and US evidence concerns ination. The response
of US ination to monetary shocks is delayed and gradual (Ramey 2016, gs. 1–4). In our model
the response of ination to monetary shocks occurs immediately, which also happens in the
textbook model. It is not clear yet how this issue can be addressed.
Comparison with the textbook NewKeynesianmodel. In both ourmodel and the textbookmodel,
looser monetary policy leads to higher ination and lower markups, boosting employment and
output. Beyond these similarities, the two models differ on several counts.
First, the textbook’s short-run Phillips curve is purely forward-looking, so it does not include
the backward-looking elements found in US data and present in the fairness model. Of course,
other variations of the textbook model append backward-looking components to the Phillips
curve; for example, having rms index their prices to past ination in periods when they cannot
reset their prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005).
Second, the textbook model cannot produce the positive correlation between perceived price
markup and ination that occurs in the fairness model, and that rationalizes the survey ndings
by Shiller (1997) and the Bank of Japan. This is because households in the textbookmodel correctly
infer that price markups are lower when they see higher ination.
Third, the textbook model cannot produce the hump-shaped response of output observed
in US data and predicted by the fairness model, since it does not include any backward-looking
element. The fairness model, by contrast, includes a backward-looking element in the form of
the perceived price markup m̂p(t), which enters the Phillips curve (13) and depends on the past
via (12). It is well understood that backward-looking elements generate hump-shaped impulse
responses. Many authors have obtained such responses by assuming that consumers form habits
(Fuhrer 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005). Under this assumption, consumers’
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behavior depends on their past consumption, which then enters the IS curve and generates
hump-shaped responses.
Fourth, the response of output in the textbook model is about one third the size of that in the
fairness model, and much smaller than in US data. Despite both models being calibrated through
microevidence on price dynamics, monetary shocks are more amplied in the fairness model.
5.5. Effects of technology shocks
The price rigidity arising from fairness concerns allows the transmission of monetary policy to
real variables, such as employment and output. The price rigidity also affects the transmission of
nonpolicy shocks to the economy. Here we illustrate the effects of a technology shock—the most
studied nonpolicy shock in modern macroeconomics—on the economy under fairness concerns.
Simulation results. We simulate the dynamical response of our calibrated model to an un-
expected and transitory shock to technology. Once again, we simulate dynamics around the
zero-ination steady state. We assume that the logarithm of technologyA(t) in the production
function (8) follows an AR(1) process, such that
â(t) = µa · â(t − 1) + ζ a(t),
where the disturbance ζ a(t) follows a white-noise process withmean zero, and µa ∈ (0, 1) governs
the persistence of shocks. We set µa = 0.9, which is typical (Gali 2008, p. 55), and we simulate the
response to an initial disturbance of ζ a(0) = 1%.
Figure 2 displays the response to the positive technology shock. The ination rate is expressed
as deviation from steady-state value, measured in percentage points and annualized (by multiply-
ing by four the variable pi (t)), whereas all other variables are expressed as percentage deviations
from steady-state values.
The increase in technology reduces marginal costs, which generates a drop in ination:
ination is negative for about four quarters and virtually zero thereaer. Observing lower prices,
customers underinfer the underlying decrease in marginal costs and thus perceive lower price
markups and fairer transactions. The improvement in perceived fairness decreases the price
elasticity of the demand for goods. Firms best respond by raising their markups. The price
markup increases by 1.3% at the peak, which depresses employment by 0.7%. Despite the drop in
employment, output initially increases by 0.5% because technology is higher.
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Figure 2. Effects of a positive technology shock
This gure describes the response of the New Keynesian model with fairness (solid, blue lines) to a 1% increase
in technology at time 0. The ination rate is a deviation from steady state, measured in percentage points and
annualized. The other variables are percentage deviations from steady state. For comparison, the gure also displays
the response of the textbook New Keynesian model (dashed, orange lines). The log-linearized equilibrium conditions
used in the simulation of the model with fairness are described in appendix B.4; those used in the simulation of the
textbook model are in appendix C. The calibration of the two models is described in table 4.
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Comparison with macroevidence. In ourmodel, an increase in technology leads to higher output
but lower employment. This prediction conforms to much of the evidence from US data (Gali and
Rabanal 2005; Basu, Fernald, and Kimball 2006; Francis and Ramey 2009). Ourmodel also predicts
that ination falls aer the increase in technology, as documented by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball
(2006, g. 4). Finally, in the model, price markups and output are positively correlated under
technology shocks. Nekarda and Ramey (2013) report evidence consistent with this prediction.
Comparison with the textbook New Keynesian model. The similarities and differences between
the fairness model and textbook model identied under monetary shocks also apply under
technology shocks. The main similarity is that in response to a technology shock, ination, price
markup, employment, and output move in the same directions in the twomodels. There are three
main differences. First, the fairness model produces a hump-shaped response of employment to
the technology shock, which the textbook model does not. Second, the fairness model produces
a negative correlation between perceived and actual price markups, whereas the two coincide in
the textbook model. Last, in response to a positive technology shock, employment falls much
more in the fairness model than in the textbook model; as a corollary, output increases much
less in the fairness model than in the textbook model.
5.6. Effects of monetary policy in the long run
Our pricing theory implies that monetary policy is nonneutral in the short run, so that a transi-
tory monetary shock affects employment. Here we develop another implication of the theory:
monetary policy is nonneutral in the long run, so that different rates of steady-state ination lead
to different levels of steady-state employment. In other words, the theory generates a nonvertical
long-run Phillips curve.
We study the long-run effects of monetary policy by comparing the steady-state equilibria
induced by different values of the exogenous component i0 in the monetary-policy rule (9). In
steady state the real interest rate equals the time discount rate ρ ≡ − ln(δ ); therefore, by choosing
i0, monetary policy perfectly controls steady-state ination:
pi =
ρ − i0
ψ − 1 .
To obtain zero ination, it sufces to set i0 = ρ; to obtain higher ination, it sufces to reduce i0.
Acclimation. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, p. 730) have hypothesized that “any stable
state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually”.We adapt this idea to ourmodel by assuming
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that people become partially acclimated to the steady-state ination rate. Formally, we generalize
the fairness function (6) to
(14) F (Mp) = 1 − θ · (Mp −M f ),
whereM f is the fair markup resulting from acclimation. We assume that the fair markup is the
weighted average of the standard markup, ϵ/(ϵ − 1), and the steady-state perceived markupMp:
(15) M f = χ ·Mp + (1 − χ ) · ϵ
ϵ − 1 .
The parameter χ ∈ [0, 1]measures acclimation: when χ = 0, there is no acclimation, as in the
previous version of the paper; when χ = 1, there is perfect acclimation, so people do not mind
whatever is happening in steady state; when χ ∈ (0, 1), people may be permanently satised or
dissatised in steady state, but less than when χ = 0.18
Analytical results. In steady state, the rate of ination determines the perceived price markup,
fairness factor, and elasticity of the fairness function:
Lemma 7. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the steady-state perceived price markup is
a strictly increasing function of steady-state ination:
Mp(pi ) = ϵ
ϵ − 1 · exp
(
γ
1 − γ pi
)
.
Hence, the steady-state fairness factor is a weakly decreasing function of steady-state ination:
F (pi ) = 1 − θ · (1 − χ ) ·
[
Mp(pi ) − ϵ
ϵ − 1
]
.
Accordingly, the steady-state elasticity of the fairness function is a strictly increasing function of
steady-state ination:
ϕ(pi ) = θ ·M
p(pi )
F (pi ) .
The proof is relegated to appendix B.3; it requires to manipulate the inference mechanism (7)
to obtainMp, and to use (14) and (15) to obtain F and ϕ.
The lemma shows that in steady state households perceive higher price markups when
ination is higher. Households understand that in steady state nominal marginal costs grow at
18This specication does not change anything at the zero-ination steady state. With zero ination,Mp = ϵ/(ϵ − 1),
soM f = ϵ/(ϵ − 1) for any χ . Therefore, for any χ , the fairness function (14) simplies to the function (6).
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the ination rate, but because of subproportional inference, they misjudge the level of those
costs and thus of price markups. Since perceived price markups are higher when ination is
higher, the fairness factor is lower—except when consumers are completely acclimated (χ = 1),
in which case the fairness factor is always one. Finally, when ination is higher, the elasticity of
the fairness function is higher. This result holds even if consumers are completely acclimated.
From the lemma, we infer that the long-run Phillips curve is upward sloping:
Proposition 3. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the steady-state price markup is a
strictly decreasing function of steady-state ination:
(16) M(pi ) = 1 + 1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + (1−δ )γ1−δγ ϕ(pi )
.
Hence, steady-state employment is a strictly increasing function of steady-state ination:
N =
[ (ν − 1)α
ν
· 1
M(pi )
] 1/(1+η)
.
Thus, the long-run Phillips curve is not vertical (xed N ) but upward sloping.
The proof is in appendix B.3; the main step is reworking (10) in steady state to obtainM.
The proposition shows that the long-run Phillips curve slopes upward for any degree of
acclimation. Hence, monetary policy is nonneutral in the long run. The reason is that in the long
run, higher ination leads to a lower price markup—and thus higher employment in general
equilibrium. In fact, (16) has the same structure as (5) in the monopoly model, so the two models
operate similarly. Aer an increase in ination, households underappreciate the increase in
nominal marginal costs, so they partly attribute the higher prices to higher markups, which they
nd unfair. Since perceived markups are higher, the price elasticity of demand increases, leading
rms to reduce their markups.
Simulation results. To quantify long-run monetary nonneutrality, we compute the long-run
Phillips curve in our calibrated model. Figure 3 displays two versions of the curve: one describes
the relationship between steady-state ination and steady-state price markup, and the other
the relationship between steady-state ination and steady-state employment. In the absence of
microevidence on acclimation, we compute the long-run Phillips curve for various degrees of
acclimation, and show how acclimation affects the slope of the Phillips curve.
With full acclimation (χ = 1), the Phillips curve is almost vertical, so that steady-state ination
has very little effect on price markup and employment: a permanent increase in ination by 1
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Figure 3. Long-run Phillips curves for various degrees of acclimation
The le-hand panel gives the relationship between steady-state ination and steady-state price markup. The right-
hand panel gives the relationship between steady-state ination and steady-state employment (measured as percent-
age deviation from employment in the zero-ination steady state). These long-run Phillips curve are constructed
using the expressions in proposition 3 under the calibration in table 4, for various degrees of acclimation: χ = 0 (no
acclimation), χ = 1/2, χ = 3/4, and χ = 1 (full acclimation).
percentage point raises employment by 0.2%. With less-than-full acclimation, the Phillips curve
becomes atter. For instance, with an acclimation of χ = 3/4, a permanent increase in ination
by 1 percentage point raises employment by 1.3%; and with a lower acclimation of χ = 1/2, a
permanent increase in ination by 1 percentage point raises employment by 3%. Finally, with no
acclimation (χ = 0), the Phillips curve is quite at, and steady-state ination has a dramatic effect
on price markup and ination. For example, a permanent increase in ination by 1 percentage
point lowers the price markup from 1.5 to 1.25.
Lemma 7 explains why greater acclimation steepens the long-run Phillips curve. With more
acclimation, the perceived fairness in steady state, F , depends less on ination, because con-
sumers adapt to a larger degree to different ination rates. As a result, the elasticity of the fairness
function in steady state, ϕ, depends less on ination. Through formula (16), this means that the
steady-state price markup responds less to steady-state ination: the Phillips curve is steeper.
Comparison with macroevidence. The property that higher steady-state ination leads to higher
steady-state employment is consistent with evidence that higher average ination leads to lower
average unemployment. King andWatson (1994, table 1) nd in US data that a permanent increase
in ination by 1 percentage point reduces the unemployment rate between 0.2 and 1.3 percentage
points, depending on the period and identication strategy. King and Watson (1997) conrm
these ndings, while highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the Phillips curve’s slope.
Quantitatively, the ndings by King and Watson are consistent with a good amount of accli-
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mation. If we neglect the effect of monetary policy on labor force participation, these results
imply that in the United States a permanent increase in ination by 1 percentage point increases
employment by 0.2% to 1.3%. This range corresponds to our model’s predictions for a degree of
acclimation between 3/4 and 1. Indeed, with an acclimation of χ = 3/4, a permanent increase in
ination by 1 percentage point raises employment by 1.3%. With more acclimation, the Phillips
curve becomes steeper, and employment rises less. With χ = 1 (full acclimation), a permanent
increase in ination by 1 percentage point only raises employment by 0.2%.
The mechanism behind the long-run Phillips curve is that ination lowers price markups.
There is also direct evidence that this mechanism operates. Benabou (1992) uncovers that in the
US retail sector, higher average ination leads to lower average markup. Banerjee and Russell
(2005) reach the same conclusion using aggregate US data.
Finally, the relationship between ination andpricemarkup could explain part of the variation
in markups measured by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) in the United States between 1980 and
2014. They nd that the average price markup increased from 1.2 to 1.7 over that period. At the
same time, average ination dropped from above 5% to about 2%. Through our mechanism, the
drop in ination could partly explain the increase in markups.
Comparison with the literature. The property that in steady state ination has an effect on
the price markup and employment also appears in the textbook New Keynesian model. With
Rotemberg (1982) pricing, an increase in steady-state ination leads to a lower price markup
and higher output, as in our model (Ascari and Rossi 2012, g. 1). With Calvo (1983) pricing, the
opposite occurs: an increase in steady-state ination leads to a higher price markup and lower
output, which appears inconsistent with available evidence (Ascari and Rossi 2012, g. 2).19
Our mechanism complements the traditional mechanism for an upward-sloping long-run
Phillips curve: that higher steady-state ination reduces the likelihood that rms experiencing
negative shocks are constrained by downward nominal wage rigidity to lay off workers (Akerlof,
Dickens, and Perry 1996; Benigno and Ricci 2011). While our mechanism operates on the goods
market instead of the labor market, the psychological origins of the two mechanisms could be
similar, since one source of downward wage rigidity is workers’ fairness concerns (Bewley 2007).
6. Conclusion
This paper develops a theory of pricing to fairness-minded customers. The theory revolves around
two assumptions. First, customers derive more utility from a good priced at a low markup—
19Although the New Keynesian models with Rotemberg and Calvo pricing are the same around the zero-ination
steady state, they differ when steady-state ination is nonzero (Ascari and Rossi 2012).
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perceived as fairly priced—than one priced at a high markup—perceived as unfairly priced.
Second, customers who estimate markups infer rms’ hidden marginal costs from rms’ prices
in a subproportional manner: they infer too little, and to the extent that they do infer, they
misperceive marginal costs as proportional to prices. These assumptions conform to copious
evidence collected from customers and rms.
The main implication of the theory is price rigidity: the passthrough of marginal costs into
prices is strictly less than one. When the theory is embedded into a New Keynesian model,
price rigidity leads to the nonneutrality of monetary policy, both in the short run and in the
long run. Furthermore, we are able to calibrate our two psychological parameters—concern for
fairness and degree of underinference—from microevidence, just as any other parameter of
the New Keynesian model. When simulating the calibrated model, we obtain realistic impulse
responses of output and employment to monetary shocks: the responses are hump-shaped and
have the appropriate amplitude. We also obtain realistic impulse responses to technology shocks:
a transitory improvement in technology leads to higher output but lower employment.
The paper delineates a mechanism through which fairness affects a market economy. Hidden
information and underinference play crucial roles. When costs are observable, or when costs are
hidden but customers infer them rationally from prices, our model with fairness is isomorphic
to a model without fairness. Only when costs are hidden and customers infer subproportionally
does fairness affect the qualitative properties of equilibrium, such as by creating price rigidity.
Another key ingredient to our theory is that fairness modies the price elasticity of demand,
which allows fairness to sway large markets—a feature not shared by many common approaches
to fairness (Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Sobel 2007).
Our model helps bridge a gap between the public’s attitude toward ination and the harm
from ination described by macroeconomic models. Romer (2002, p. 519) argues that “There
is a wide gap between the popular view of ination and the costs of ination that economist
can identify. Ination is intensely disliked. In periods when ination is moderately high in the
United States, for example, it is oen cited in opinion polls as the most important problem facing
the country. It appears to have an important effect on the outcome of Presidential elections.”
This assessment is consistent with the ndings by Shiller (1997) and the results of the Bank of
Japan’s survey displayed in table 1, which conrm that ination is indeed intensely disliked. “Yet,”
Romer notes, “economists have difculty in identifying substantial costs of ination.” Our model
contributes to explaining such intense dislike for ination.
Finally, we hope that our theory might be fruitfully applied to the study of optimal monetary
policy. Since its microfoundations match the motivations of real-world customers and rms, as
well as their real-world reactions to ination and deation, our theory should underpin a more
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accurate welfare function that would enhance the design of monetary policy.
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Appendix A. Derivations for themonopoly model
We derive several of the monopoly results stated in section 4. In particular, we provide proofs for
proposition 1 and corollary 1.
A.1. Properties of the prot function
We show that in all the cases treated in section 4, the monopoly’s prot function is single-peaked
(strictly increasing to a peak, then strictly decreasing), so its maximum can be determined by
rst-order condition.
The monopoly chooses a price P > C to maximize prots
V (P) = (P −C) · Yd(P).
The derivative of the prot function is
V ′(P) = Yd + (P −C) dY
d
dP
= Yd − (P −C) Y
d
P
E(P),
where E(P) ≡ −d ln(Yd)/d ln(P) = −(P/Yd)(dYd/dP) is the price elasticity of demand. Hence
the derivative of the prot function satises
(A1) V ′(P) = Yd(P)
[
1 − P −C
P
E(P)
]
.
We now study the properties of the derivative (A1) in the various cases considered in section 4.
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No fairness concerns. Without fairness concerns, the price elasticity of demand is E = ϵ (sec-
tion 4.3). Hence the derivative (A1) becomes
V ′(P) = Yd(P)
[
1 − ϵ P −C
P
]
.
The function P 7→ (P −C)/P is strictly increasing from 0 to 1 as P increases fromC to +∞, so the
term in square brackets is strictly decreasing from 1 to 1 − ϵ < 0 as P increases fromC to +∞.
Hence, the term in square brackets has a unique root P∗ on (C,+∞), is positive for P < P∗, and
is negative for P > P∗. SinceYd(P) > 0, these properties transfer to the derivative of the prot
function:V ′(P) > 0 for P ∈ (C, P∗),V ′(P) = 0 at P = P∗, andV ′(P) < 0 for P ∈ (P∗,+∞). We
conclude that the prot function is single-peaked, and its maximum P∗ is the unique solution to
the rst-order conditionV ′(P) = 0.
Fairness concerns and observable costs. With fairness concerns and observable costs, the price
elasticity of demand is E = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ(P/C) (section 4.4). The prot function is now dened for
P ∈ (C,Mh ·C). The derivative (A1) becomes
V ′(P) = Yd(P)
[
1 − P −C
P
· {ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ(P/C)}
]
.
Again, the function P 7→ (P − C)/P is strictly increasing from 0 to 1 as P increases fromC to
+∞. The elasticity of the fairness function ϕ(P/C) is strictly increasing from ϕ(1) > 0 to +∞ as P
increases fromC toMh ·C (lemma 2). Hence the term in square brackets is strictly decreasing
from 1 to −∞ as P increases fromC toMh ·C. This implies that the term in square brackets has a
unique root P∗ on (C,Mh ·C), is positive for P < P∗, and is negative for P > P∗. Following the
same argument as in the previous case, we conclude that the prot function is single-peaked,
and its maximum P∗ is the unique solution to the rst-order conditionV ′(P) = 0.
Fairness concerns and rational inference of costs. With fairness concerns rational inference of
marginal costs, the price elasticity of demand is again E = ϵ (section 4.5). Hence, as in the case of
no fairness concerns, the prot function is single-peaked so its maximum is the unique solution
to the rst-order conditionV ′(P) = 0.
Fairness concerns and subproportional inference of costs. With fairness concerns and subpropor-
tional inference of costs, the price elasticity of demand is E = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ(Mp(P)) (section 4.6).
51
The prot function is now dened for P ∈ (C, Pb), where the upper bound is dened by
(A2) Pb =
ϵ
ϵ − 1 (M
h)1/γCb .
The price Pb is such that at Pb , the perceived markup reaches the upper bound of the domain of
the fairness function:Mp(Pb) = Mh.20 The derivative (A1) becomes
V ′(P) = Yd(P)
[
1 − P −C
P
· {ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ(Mp(P))}] .
Again, the function P 7→ (P −C)/P is strictly increasing from 0 to 1 as P increases fromC to +∞.
The perceived markupMp(P) is strictly increasing fromMp(C) > 0 toMh as P increases fromC
to Pb (lemma 5). Hence, the elasticity of the fairness functionϕ(Mp(P)) is strictly increasing from
ϕ(Mp(C)) > 0 to+∞ as P increases fromC to Pb (lemma 2). Sinceγ > 0, we infer that the term in
square brackets is strictly decreasing from 1 to −∞ as P increases fromC to Pb . Thus the term in
square brackets has a unique root P∗ on (C, Pb), is positive for P < P∗, and is negative for P > P∗.
Following the same argument as in the previous cases, we conclude that the prot function is
single-peaked, and its maximum P∗ is the unique solution to the rst-order conditionV ′(P) = 0.
A.2. Proof of proposition 1
Markup. Since customers care about fairness and infer subproportionally, the price elasticity
of demand is E = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ(Mp(P)). Moreover, the monopoly’s optimal markup is M =
E/(E − 1) = 1 + 1/(E − 1). Combining these equations yields the markup
(A3) M = 1 +
1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + γϕ(Mp(M ·C)) .
In (A3) we have used the fact that the price is related to the markup by P = M ·C.
Toward showing that (A3) admits a unique solution, we introduce the price Pb dened by
(A2) and the markupMb = Pb/C > 1. Since P = M ·C, P strictly increases from 0 to Pb whenM
increases from 0 toMb . Next, lemma 5 shows thatMp(P) strictly increases from 0 toMh when P
increases from 0 to Pb . Last, lemma 2 indicates that ϕ(Mp) strictly increases from 0 to∞ when
Mp increases from 0 toMh. As γ > 0, we conclude that whenM increases from 0 toMb > 1, the
right-hand side of (A3) strictly decreases from ϵ/(ϵ − 1) to 1. Hence, (A3) has a unique solution
M ∈ [0,Mb ] , implying that the markup exists and unique. Given the range of values taken by the
right-hand side of (A3), we also infer thatM ∈ (1, ϵ/(ϵ − 1)).
20We know that Pb > C becauseCb satisesCb > (ϵ − 1) · (Mh)−1/γ ·C/ϵ (denition 3).
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Passthrough. We now compute the cost passthrough, β = d ln(P)/d ln(C). The equilibrium
price is P = M(Mp(P)) ·C, where the markupM(Mp) is given by (A3). Using this price equation,
we obtain
β =
d ln(M)
d ln(Mp) ·
d ln(Mp)
d ln(P) ·
d ln(P)
d ln(C) + 1.
Since d ln(Mp)/d ln(P) = γ (lemma 5) and d ln(P)/d ln(C) = β (by denition), we get
(A4) β =
1
1 − γ d ln(M)d ln(Mp )
.
Our next step is to compute the elasticity ofM(Mp) with respect toMp from (A3):
− d ln(M)
d ln(Mp) = −
1
M
· dM
d ln(Mp) =
1
M
· 1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + γϕ
· 1
1 + γϕ
· γ · dϕ
d ln(Mp) .
Using (A3), we nd that
(ϵ − 1)(1 + γϕ)M = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ .
Moreover, by denition, the superelasticity σ of the fairness function satises ϕσ = dϕ/d ln(Mp).
Combining these three results, we obtain
(A5) − d ln(M)
d ln(Mp) =
γϕσ
[ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ](1 + γϕ) .
Finally, combining (A4) with (A5) yields the cost passthrough
(A6) β =
1
1 + γ
2ϕσ
(1+γϕ)[ϵ+(ϵ−1)γϕ]
.
Since γ > 0 (denition 3), ϕ > 0 (lemma 2), and σ > 0 (also lemma 2), we infer that β ∈ (0, 1).
A.3. Proof of corollary 1
We apply the results of proposition 1 to a specic fairness function:
(A7) F (Mp) = 1 − θ ·
(
Mp − ϵ
ϵ − 1
)
.
We also assume that customers are acclimated, soMp = ϵ/(ϵ − 1) and F = 1.
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Preliminary results. The elasticity of the fairness function (A7) is
ϕ = −M
p
F
· dF
dMp
=
Mp
F
· θ .
Accordingly, the superelasticity of the fairness function (A7) satises
σ =
d ln(ϕ)
d ln(Mp) = 1 −
d ln(F )
d ln(Mp) = 1 + ϕ .
WhenMp = ϵ/(ϵ − 1) and F = 1, the elasticity and superelasticity simplify to
ϕ =
ϵθ
ϵ − 1(A8)
σ = 1 +
ϵθ
ϵ − 1 .(A9)
Markup. Combining (A3) with (A8), we obtain the following markup:
M = 1 +
1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + γϵθ/(ϵ − 1) = 1 +
1
(1 + γθ )ϵ − 1 .
This expression shows thatM is lower when ϵ , γ , or θ are higher.
Passthrough. Combining (A6) with (A8) and (A9), we nd that the cost passthrough β satises
1/β = 1 + γ
2ϵθ [(ϵ − 1) + ϵθ ]
(ϵ − 1) [(ϵ − 1) + γϵθ ] (ϵ + γϵθ ) = 1 +
γ 2θ [(1 + θ )ϵ − 1]
(ϵ − 1) [(1 + γθ )ϵ − 1] (1 + γθ ) .
Next we introduce the auxiliary function
(A10) ∆(γ ,θ , ϵ) = γ
2θ [(1 + θ )ϵ − 1]
(ϵ − 1) [(1 + γθ )ϵ − 1] (1 + γθ ) ,
where γ > 0, θ > 0, and ϵ > 1. Dividing numerator and denominator of ∆ by γ 2, we get
∆(γ ,θ , ϵ) = θ [(1 + θ )ϵ − 1](ϵ − 1) [θϵ + (ϵ − 1)/γ ] (θ + 1/γ ) .
The denominator is decreasing in γ , so ∆ is increasing in γ . Since β = 1/(1 + ∆), we conclude
that β is decreasing in γ .
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Next, we divide numerator and denominator of ∆ in (A10) by (ϵ − 1):
∆(γ ,θ , ϵ) = γ
2θ [1 + θϵ/(ϵ − 1)]
[(1 + γθ )ϵ − 1] (1 + γθ ) .
Since ϵ/(ϵ − 1) is decreasing in ϵ > 1 and (1 + γθ )ϵ − 1 is increasing in ϵ , ∆ is decreasing in ϵ . As
β = 1/(1 + ∆), we conclude that β is increasing in ϵ .
Last, we divide numerator and denominator of ∆ in (A10) by θ (ϵθ + ϵ − 1):
∆(γ ,θ , ϵ) = γ
2
(ϵ − 1) (γ + 1/θ ) γϵθ+ϵ−1ϵθ+ϵ−1
,
First, γ + 1/θ is decreasing in θ > 0. Second, (γϵθ + ϵ − 1)/(ϵθ + ϵ − 1) is decreasing in θ > 0
because γ ≤ 1. Hence, ∆ is increasing in θ > 0. Since β = 1/(1 + ∆), we conclude that β is
decreasing in θ .
Appendix B. Derivations for the New Keynesianmodel
We derive the properties of the New Keynesian model with fairness presented in section 5. In
particular, we prove lemmas 6 and 7, as well as propositions 2 and 3.
B.1. Household and rm problems
We begin by solving the problems of households and rms.
Household k’s problem. To solve household k ’s problem, we set up the Lagrangian:
Lk = E0
∞∑
t=0
δ t
{
ln(Zk(t)) − Nk(t)
1+η
1 + η
+Ak(t)
[
Wk(t)Nk(t) + Bk(t − 1) +Vk(t) −Q(t)Bk(t) −
∫ 1
0
Pj(t)Yjk(t)dj
]
+ Bk(t)
[
Ndk (t ,Wk(t)) − Nk(t)
] }
.
In the Lagrangian,Ak(t) is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint in period t ; Bk(t)
is the Lagrange multiplier on the labor-demand constraint in period t ; and Zk(t) is the fairness-
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adjusted consumption index:
(A11) Zk(t) =
[∫ 1
0
Zjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ dj
]ϵ/(ϵ−1)
.
In the consumption index, Zjk(t) is the fairness-adjusted consumption of good j:
(A12) Zjk(t) = Fj(t) · Yjk(t).
First-order conditions with respect to consumption. We rst compute the rst-order conditions
with respect toYjk(t) for all goods j ∈ [0, 1]: ∂Lk/∂Yjk(t) = 0. From the denitions of Zk(t) and
Zjk(t) given by (A11) and (A12), we nd
∂Zjk(t)
∂Yjk(t) = Fj(t) and
∂Zk(t)
∂Zjk(t) =
[
Zjk(t)
Zk(t)
]−1/ϵ
dj .
Hence the rst-order conditions imply that for all j ∈ [0, 1],
(A13)
[
Zjk(t)
Zk(t)
]−1/ϵ Fj(t)
Zk(t) = Ak(t)Pj(t).
Taking (A13) to the power of 1 − ϵ and reshufing terms, we then obtain
1
Zk(t)1−ϵ ·
1
Zk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ
· Zjk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ = Ak(t)1−ϵ
[
Pj(t)
Fj(t)
] 1−ϵ
.
We integrate this equation over j ∈ [0, 1], use the denition ofZk(t) given by (A11), and introduce
the price index
(A14) X (t) =
{∫ 1
0
[
Pj(t)
Fj(t)
] 1−ϵ
dj
}1/(1−ϵ)
.
We obtain the following:
1
Zk(t)1−ϵ ·
Zk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ
Zk(t)(ϵ−1)/ϵ
= Ak(t)1−ϵX (t)1−ϵ .
From this equation we infer
(A15) Ak(t) = 1
X (t)Zk(t) .
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Last, combining (A13) and (A15), we nd that the optimal fairness-adjusted consumption of
good j by household k satises
Zjk(t) = Zk(t)
[
Pj(t)
X (t)
]−ϵ
Fj(t)ϵ .
As consumption and fairness-adjusted consumption of good j are related byYjk(t) = Zjk(t)/Fj(t),
the optimal consumption of good j by household k satises
(A16) Yjk(t) = Zk(t)
[
Pj(t)
X (t)
]−ϵ
Fj(t)ϵ−1.
Integrating (A16) over all households k ∈ [0, 1] yields the output of good j:
Yj(t) = Z (t)
[
Pj(t)
X (t)
]−ϵ
Fj(t)ϵ−1.
We note that the fairness factor Fj(t) is a function of the perceived price markup, Fj(t) =
Fj(Pj(t)/Cpj (t)), and that the perceived marginal costCpj (t) follows the law of motion (7). These
observations allow us to obtain the demand for good j:
Ydj (t , Pj(t),Cpj (t − 1)) = Z (t)
[
Pj(t)
X (t)
]−ϵ
Fj
(( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ [ Pj(t)
C
p
j (t − 1)
]γ )ϵ−1
.
For future reference, the elasticities of the functionYdj (t , Pj(t),Cpj (t − 1)) are
−
∂ ln
(
Ydj
)
∂ ln
(
Pj
) = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕj(Mpj (t)) ≡ Ej(Mpj (t))(A17)
∂ ln
(
Ydj
)
∂ ln
(
C
p
j
) = (ϵ − 1)γϕj(Mpj (t)) = Ej(Mpj (t)) − ϵ .(A18)
The function Ej(Mpj ) gives the price elasticity of the demand for good j, normalized to be positive.
Moreover, using (A16) and the denition of the price indexX given by (A14), we nd that∫ 1
0
PjYjk dj = X
ϵZk
∫ 1
0
(
Pj
Fj
)1−ϵ
dj = XZk .
This means that when households optimally allocate their consumption expenditures across
goods, the price of one unit of fairness-adjusted consumption index isX .
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First-order condition with respect to bonds. The rst-order condition with respect to Bk(t) is
∂Lk/∂Bk(t) = 0, which gives
Q(t)Ak(t) = δ Et (Ak(t + 1)).
Using (A15), we obtain household k ’s consumption Euler equation:
(A19) Q(t) = δ Et
(
X (t)Zk(t)
X (t + 1)Zk(t + 1)
)
.
This equation governs how the household smooths fairness-adjusted consumption over time.
Firm j’s problem. Since the wages set by households depend on rms’ labor demands, we turn
to the rms’ problems before nishing the households’ problems. To solve rm j ’s problem, we
set up the Lagrangian:
Lj = E0
∞∑
t=0
Γ (t)
{
Pj(t)Yj(t) −
∫ 1
0
Wk(t)Njk(t)dk
+Hj(t)
[
Ydj (t , Pj(t),Cpj (t − 1)) − Yj(t)
]
+ Jj(t)
[
Aj(t)Nj(t)α − Yj(t)
]
+Kj(t)
[
C
p
j (t − 1)γ
[
ϵ − 1
ϵ
Pj(t)
] 1−γ
−Cpj (t)
] }
.
In the Lagrangian,Hj(t) is the Lagrange multiplier on the demand constraint in period t ; Jj(t) is
the Lagrange multiplier on the production constraint in period t ;Kj(t) is the Lagrange multiplier
on the law of motion of the perceived marginal cost in period t ; and Nj(t) is the employment
index:
(A20) Nj(t) =
[∫ 1
0
Njk(t)(ν−1)/ν dk
]ν/(ν−1)
.
First-order conditions with respect to employment. We compute the rst-order conditions with
respect to Njk(t) for all labor services k ∈ [0, 1]: ∂Lj/∂Njk(t) = 0. From the denition of Nj(t)
given by (A20), we know that
∂Nj(t)
∂Njk(t) =
[
Njk(t)
Nj(t)
]−1/ν
dk .
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Hence the rst-order conditions imply that for all k ∈ [0, 1],
(A21) Wk(t) = αJj(t)Aj(t)Nj(t)α−1
[
Njk(t)
Nj(t)
]−1/ν
.
Toward deriving rm j ’s labor demand, we introduce the wage index
(A22) W (t) =
[∫ 1
0
Wk(t)1−ν dk
] 1/(1−ν )
.
Taking (A21) to the power of 1 − ν , we obtain
Wk(t)1−ν =
[
αJj(t)Aj(t)Nj(t)α−1
] 1−ν 1
Nj(t)(ν−1)/ν
Njk(t)(ν−1)/ν .
Integrating this condition over k ∈ [0, 1] and using the denitions of Nj andW given by (A20)
and (A22), we nd
W (t)1−ν = [αJj(t)Aj(t)Nj(t)α−1] 1−ν Nj(t)(ν−1)/ν
Nj(t)(ν−1)/ν
.
From this equation we infer
(A23) W (t) = αJj(t)Aj(t)Nj(t)α−1.
Last, we combine (A21) and (A23) to determine the quantity of labor that rm j hires from
household k:
(A24) Njk(t) = Nj(t)
[
Wk(t)
W (t)
]−ν
.
Integrating (A24) over all rms j ∈ [0, 1] yields the demand for labor service k:
(A25) Ndk (t ,Wk(t)) = N (t)
[
Wk(t)
W (t)
]−ν
,
where N (t) =
∫ 1
0 Nj(t)dj is aggregate employment.
Moreover, (A22) and (A24) imply that∫ 1
0
WkNjk dk =W
νNj
∫ 1
0
W 1−νk dk =WNj .
This means that when rms optimally allocate their wage bill across labor services, the cost of
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one unit of labor index isW .
First-order conditions with respect to labor and wage. We now nish solving household k ’s
problem using labor demand (A25). The rst-order conditions with respect to Nk(t) andWk(t)
are ∂Lk/∂Nk(t) = 0 and ∂Lk/∂Wk(t) = 0; they yield
Nk(t)η = Ak(t)Wk(t) − Bk(t)(A26)
Ak(t)Nk(t) = −Bk(t)
dNd
k
dWk
.(A27)
Since the elasticity of Nd
k
with respect toWk is −ν , we infer from (A27) that
(A28) Ak(t)Wk(t) = Bk(t)ν .
Plugging this result into (A26), we obtain
Bk(t) = Nk(t)
η
ν − 1 .
Combining this result with (A28) then yields
Wk(t) = ν
ν − 1 ·
Nk(t)η
Ak(t) .
Finally, by merging this equation with (A15), we nd that household k sets its wage rate at
(A29)
Wk(t)
X (t) =
ν
ν − 1Nk(t)
ηZk(t).
This equation shows that households set their real wage at a markup of ν/(ν − 1) > 1 over the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
First-order condition with respect to output. We then nish solving rm j ’s problem. The rst-
order condition with respect toYj(t) is ∂Lj/∂Yj(t) = 0, which gives
Pj(t) = Hj(t) + Jj(t).
Using the value of Jj(t) given by (A23), we then obtain
(A30) Hj(t) = Pj(t)
[
1 − W (t)/Pj(t)
αAj(t)Nj(t)α−1
]
.
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Note that rm j ’s nominal marginal cost is the nominal wage divided by the marginal product of
labor:
(A31) Cj(t) = W (t)
αAj(t)Nj(t)α−1 .
Hence the rst-order condition (A30) can be written
(A32) Hj(t) = Pj(t)
[
1 − Cj(t)
Pj(t)
]
.
Given that rm j ’s markup isMj(t) = Pj(t)/Cj(t), we rewrite this equation as
(A33)
Hj(t)
Pj(t) =
Mj(t) − 1
Mj(t) .
First-order condition with respect to price. The rst-order condition of rm j ’s problem with
respect to Pj(t) is ∂Lj/∂Pj(t) = 0. It yields
(A34) 0 = Yj(t) +Hj(t)
∂Ydj
∂Pj
+ (1 − γ )Kj(t)
C
p
j (t)
Pj(t) .
We divide this condition by Yj(t), and we insert the price elasticity of the demand for good j,
Ej(Mpj (t)) = −∂ ln(Ydj )/∂ ln(Pj), as well as the perceived price markup for good j, Mpj (t) =
Pj(t)/Cpj (t). We obtain
0 = 1 −
Hj(t)Ej(Mpj (t))
Pj(t) + (1 − γ )
Kj(t)
Yj(t)Mpj (t)
.
Using the value ofHj(t) given by (A33), we nally obtain
(A35) (1 − γ ) Kj(t)
Yj(t)Mpj (t)
=
Mj(t) − 1
Mj(t) Ej(M
p
j (t)) − 1.
First-order condition with respect to perceived marginal cost. Finally, the rst-order condition
of rm j ’s problem with respect toCpj (t) is ∂Lj/∂Cpj (t) = 0. It gives
0 = Et
(
Γ (t + 1)
Γ (t) Hj(t + 1)
∂Ydj
∂C
p
j
)
+ γ Et
(
Γ (t + 1)
Γ (t) Kj(t + 1)
C
p
j (t + 1)
C
p
j (t)
)
− Kj(t).
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And using the elasticity given by (A18), we nd
Kj(t) = Et
(
Γ (t + 1)
Γ (t)
{
Hj(t + 1)
Yj(t + 1)
C
p
j (t)
[Ej(Mpj (t + 1)) − ϵ] + γKj(t + 1)
C
p
j (t + 1)
C
p
j (t)
})
.
Wemodify this equation in two steps: rst, we multiply it byCpj (t)/[Yj(t)Pj(t)]; second, we insert
the perceived price markupsMpj (t) = Pj(t)/Cpj (t) andMpj (t + 1) = Pj(t + 1)/Cpj (t + 1). We get
Kj(t)Mpj (t)
Yj(t) = Et
(
Γ (t +1)Yj(t +1)Pj(t +1)
Γ (t)Yj(t)Pj(t)
{
Hj(t +1)
Pj(t +1) [Ej(M
p
j (t +1))−ϵ]+γ
Kj(t +1)Mpj (t +1)
Yj(t +1)
})
.
Last, we multiply the equation by (1 − γ ); and we eliminateHj(t + 1) using (A33) andKj(t) and
Kj(t + 1) using (A35). We obtain rm j ’s pricing equation, which links its markup to its perceived
markup:
Mj(t) − 1
Mj(t) Ej(M
p
j (t)) =(A36)
1+Et
(
Γ (t + 1)Yj(t + 1)Pj(t + 1)
Γ (t)Yj(t)Pj(t)
{
Mj(t + 1) − 1
Mj(t + 1) [Ej(M
p
j (t + 1)) − (1 − γ )ϵ] − γ
})
.
B.2. Equilibrium
We present the equilibrium of the model. Because all households and rms face the same condi-
tions, they all behave the same in equilibrium, so we drop the subscripts j and k on all variables.
The equilibrium can be described by seven variables: output Y (t), employment N (t), the
price level P(t), the wageW (t), the bond priceQ(t), the price markupM(t), and the perceived
price markupMp(t). These seven variables are determined by seven equations.
The rst equation is the monetary-policy rule, given by (9). The second equation is the
production function, which is directly obtained from (8):
(A37) Y (t) = A(t)N (t)α .
The third equation is the usual consumption Euler equation, which is obtained by simplifying
(A19). By symmetryX (t) = P(t)/F (t) and Zk(t) = F (t)Y (t), so (A19) simplies to
(A38) Q(t) = δ Et
(
P(t)Y (t)
P(t + 1)Y (t + 1)
)
.
The fourth equation is the usual expression for the real wage, which is obtained by simplifying
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(A29). Once again, by symmetryX (t) = P(t)/F (t) and Zk(t) = F (t)Y (t), so (A29) yields
W (t)
P(t) =
ν
ν − 1N (t)
ηY (t).
Combining this equation with (A37), we express the real wage as a function of employment:
(A39)
W (t)
P(t) =
ν
ν − 1A(t)N (t)
η+α .
The h equation is the standard link between price markup and employment, which is
obtained from the denition of the price markup. In a symmetric economy the price markup
is just the inverse of the real marginal cost:M(t) = P(t)/C(t). Combining the expression of the
nominal marginal cost given by (A31) with the value of the real wage given by (A39), we infer the
real marginal cost:
C(t)
P(t) =
ν
(ν − 1)α N (t)
1+η .
Since the price markup is the inverse of the real marginal cost, we nd
(A40) N (t) =
[ (ν − 1)α
ν
· 1
M(t)
] 1/(1+η)
.
The sixth equation is a pricing equation, which is obtained by simplifying (A36). Recall that
Γ (t) = δ tX (0)Z (0)/[X (t)Z (t)]. Since by symmetry Z (t) = F (t)Y (t) and X (t) = P(t)/F (t), we
have
Γ (t + 1)
Γ (t) = δ ·
X (t)
X (t + 1) ·
Z (t)
Z (t + 1) = δ ·
P(t)
P(t + 1) ·
Y (t)
Y (t + 1) .
Hence, (A36) simplies to
(A41)
M(t) − 1
M(t) E(M
p(t)) = 1 − δγ + δ Et
(
M(t + 1) − 1
M(t + 1)
[
E(Mp(t + 1)) − (1 − γ )ϵ ] ) .
This pricing equation shows the dynamic relationship between actual and perceived price
markups. Unlike the other equilibrium conditions—which are the same as in the textbookmodel—
the pricing equation is unique to the model with fairness.
The seventh and last equation is the law of motion of the perceived price markup. It derives
from the law of motion of the perceived marginal cost, given by (7). SinceMp(t) = P(t)/Cp(t), (7)
implies
Mp(t) =
[
P(t)
(ϵ − 1)P(t)/ϵ
] 1−γ [
P(t)
Cp(t − 1)
]γ
=
( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ [ P(t)
P(t − 1)
]γ [
P(t − 1)
Cp(t − 1)
]γ
.
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Hence the perceived price markup satises
(A42) Mp(t) =
( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ [ P(t)
P(t − 1)
]γ [
Mp(t − 1)]γ .
B.3. Steady-state equilibrium
Wenow apply the equilibrium conditions to a steady-state environment, in which all real variables
are constant and all nominal variables grow at the ination rate, pi . We then use these steady-state
conditions to prove lemma 7 and proposition 3.
We describe the steady-state equilibrium by six variables: outputY , employment N , ination
pi , real interest rate r , price markupM, and perceived price markupMp. These six variables are
governed by six equations.
Steady-state equilibrium conditions. First, in steady state the consumption Euler equation (A38)
gives
Q = δ · P(t)
P(t + 1) .
Taking the logarithm of this equation yields −i = −ρ − pi , where ρ ≡ − ln(δ ) is the time discount
rate. Hence the steady-state real interest rate r = i − pi satises
r = ρ.
Second, in steady state themonetary-policy rule (9) implies that r = i0+ (ψ − 1)pi . Since r = ρ,
the steady-state ination rate is
pi =
ρ − i0
ψ − 1 .
Third, in steady state the law of motion of the perceived price markup (A42) implies that
(Mp)1−γ =
( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ [ P(t)
P(t − 1)
]γ
.
Taking this expression to the power of 1/(1 − γ ), and noting that in steady state P(t)/P(t − 1) =
exp(pi ), we nd that the steady-state perceived price markup is
(A43) Mp =
ϵ
ϵ − 1 exp
(
γ
1 − γ pi
)
.
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Fourth, in steady state the pricing equation (A41) implies that
(A44) 0 = 1 − δγ − M − 1
M
E(Mp) + δM − 1
M
[
E(Mp) − (1 − γ )ϵ
]
.
Reshufing this expression, we obtain the following:
0 = (1 − δγ )M − (M − 1)E(Mp) + δ (M − 1)
[
E(Mp) − (1 − γ )ϵ
]
0 =
[
1 − δγ − (1 − δ )E(Mp) − δ (1 − γ )ϵ
]
M + (1 − δ )E(Mp) + δ (1 − γ )ϵ
M =
(1 − δ )E(Mp) + δ (1 − γ )ϵ
(1 − δ )E(Mp) + δ (1 − γ )ϵ − (1 − δγ )
M = 1 +
(1 − δγ )
(1 − δ )E(Mp) + (δ − δγ )ϵ − (1 − δγ ) .(A45)
In addition, (A17) shows that in steady state the price elasticity of demand is E(Mp) = ϵ + (ϵ −
1)γϕ(Mp). Using this expression, we rewrite the denominator of the fraction in (A45) as
(1 − δ )ϵ + (1 − δ )(ϵ − 1)γϕ(Mp) + (δ − δγ )ϵ − (1 − δγ ) = (ϵ − 1)
[
(1 − δγ ) + (1 − δ )γϕ(Mp)
]
.
Plugging this result back into (A45), we obtain the steady-state price markup:
(A46) M = 1 +
1
ϵ − 1 ·
1
1 + (1−δ )γ1−δγ ϕ(Mp)
.
Fih, we apply the markup-employment relation (A40) to the steady state. We obtain steady-
state employment:
(A47) N =
[ (ν − 1)α
ν
· 1
M
] 1/(1+η)
.
Sixth, we apply the production function (A37) to the steady state. We obtain steady-state
output:
Y = A · N α .
Proof of lemma 7. The expression for the steady-state perceived price markupMp in lemma 7
comes from (A43). The expression for the steady-state fairness factor F = F (Mp) is obtained
by combining (14) with (15). Last, the expression for the steady-state elasticity of the fairness
function ϕ = ϕ(Mp) = −F ′(Mp) ·Mp/F (Mp) is obtained by noting that with the fairness function
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(14), F ′(Mp) = θ . The properties thatMp and ϕ are strictly increasing in pi , and that F is weakly
decreasing in pi , follow from the assumptions that ϵ > 1, γ ∈ (0, 1), θ > 0, and 1 − χ ≥ 0.
Proof of proposition 3. The expression for the steady-state price markup M in proposition 3
comes from (A46). The expression for steady-state employment N comes from (A47). Since δ < 1,
γ ∈ (0, 1), and ϕ > 0 is strictly increasing in pi (lemma 7), it follows thatM is strictly decreasing
in pi . And since α > 0, ν > 1, η > 0, andM > 0 is strictly decreasing in pi , it follows that N is
strictly increasing in pi .
B.4. Log-linearized equilibrium
We log-linearize the equilibriumconditions around a steady state.We thenuse these log-linearized
conditions to prove lemma 6 and proposition 2. We also use these conditions to compute the
impulse responses to monetary and technology shocks that are presented in gures 1 and 2.
We describe the log-linearized equilibrium by six variables. The rst four variables are the
log-deviations from steady state of output, employment, price markup, and perceived price
markup: ŷ(t), n̂(t), m̂(t), and m̂p(t). The last two variables are the deviations from steady state of
the real-interest and ination rates: r̂ (t) and pi (t). These six variables are governed by six linear
equations.
Log-linear equilibrium conditions. Several of the original equilibrium conditions take a log-
linear form, so they can immediately be log-linearized. The rst is the monetary-policy rule (9),
which implies
(A48) r̂ (t) = î0(t) + (ψ − 1)pi (t).
The second is the production function (A37), which gives
(A49) ŷ(t) = â(t) + αn̂(t).
The third is markup-employment relation (A40), which yields
(A50) m̂(t) = −(1 + η)n̂(t).
The fourth is the law of motion for the perceived price markup (A42), which gives
(A51) m̂p(t) = γ
[
pi (t) + m̂p(t − 1)
]
.
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IS equation. The h equation is the IS equation, which is based on the consumption Euler
equation (A38). We start by computing a log-linear approximation of (A38), as in Gali (2008,
pp. 35–36):
ln(Y (t)) = Et (ln(Y (t + 1))) + Et (pi (t + 1)) + ρ − i(t),
where ρ = − ln(δ ) is the time discount rate. Subtracting the steady-state values of both sides
yields
ŷ(t) = Et (ŷ(t + 1)) + Et (pi (t + 1)) − î(t).
Finally, we introduce the values of ŷ(t) and ŷ(t + 1) given by (A49), an the value of î(t) given by
the monetary-policy rule (9). We obtain the IS equation:
(A52) αn̂(t) +ψpi (t) = α Et (n̂(t + 1)) + Et (pi (t + 1)) − î0(t) − â(t) + Et (â(t + 1)).
Short-run Phillips curve. The sixth and nal equation is the short-run Phillips curve. It is based
on the pricing equation (A41).
As a rst step toward computing the Phillips curve, we compute the elasticity of the price
elasticity of demand, E(Mp) = ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ(Mp). Given that the elasticity ofϕ(Mp) isσ (lemma 2),
the elasticity of E(Mp) at the steady state is
(A53)
d ln(E)
d ln(Mp) =
(ϵ − 1)γϕ
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ
· σ ≡ Ω0.
Second, we introduce the auxiliary function
Λ1(M) = M − 1
M
.
Its elasticity at the steady state is
d ln(Λ1)
d ln(M) =
M
M − 1 − 1 =
1
M − 1 ≡ Ω1.
Using the value ofM in (A46), we nd thatΩ1 satises
(A54) Ω1 = (ϵ − 1)
[
1 +
(1 − δ )γ
1 − δγ ϕ
]
.
The le-hand side of (A41) can be written LHS = Λ1(M(t)) · E(Mp(t)). Accordingly, around the
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steady state the log-linear approximation of LHS is
(A55) ln(LHS) − ln(LHS) = Ω1m̂(t) +Ω0m̂p(t).
Next, we introduce another auxiliary function:
Λ2(Mp) = E(Mp) − (1 − γ )ϵ = γ
[
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ(Mp)] .
Its elasticity at the steady state is
(A56)
d ln(Λ2)
d ln(Mp) =
(ϵ − 1)ϕ
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ
· σ ≡ Ω2.
We also introduce the auxiliary function
Λ3(x) = 1 − δγ + δx .
Its elasticity is
d ln(Λ3)
d ln(x) =
δx
Λ3
≡ Ω3.
The right-hand side of (A41) (abstracting from the expectation operator) can be written RHS =
Λ3(Λ1(M(t + 1)) · Λ2(Mp(t + 1)). Hence, around the steady state the log-linear approximation of
RHS is
(A57) ln(RHS) − ln(RHS) = Ω3 ·
[
Ω1m̂(t + 1) +Ω2m̂p(t + 1)
]
,
where the elasticityΩ3 is evaluated at Λ3 = RHS = LHS = E · Λ1 and x = Λ1 · Λ2. This implies
that in (A57) we have
(A58) Ω3 =
δΛ1 · Λ2
E · Λ1
= δγ
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ
.
We now bring these results together. Equation (A41) can be written LHS = Et (RHS). This
equation also holds in steady state so LHS = RHS. Combining these two equations, we infer
exp
(
ln(LHS) − ln(LHS)
)
= Et
(
exp
(
ln(RHS) − ln(RHS)
))
.
Around x = 0, we have exp(x) = 1 + x . Applying this approximation to both sides of the previous
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equation, we nd
1 + ln(LHS) − ln(LHS) = 1 + Et
(
ln(RHS) − ln(RHS)
)
.
We then use the results in (A55) and (A57):
Ω1m̂(t) +Ω0m̂p(t) = Ω3 ·
[
Ω1 Et (m̂(t + 1)) +Ω2 Et
(
m̂p(t + 1)
)]
.
We now divide this equation by Ω0; insert the values of m̂(t) and m̂(t + 1) given by (A50); and
insert the value of m̂p(t + 1) given by (A51). We obtain
(A59) − (1 + η)Ω1
Ω0
n̂(t) + m̂p(t) = −(1 + η)Ω3Ω1
Ω0
Et (n̂(t + 1)) + γΩ3Ω2
Ω0
Et
(
pi (t + 1) + m̂p(t)
)
.
Using (A53), (A54), (A56), and (A58), we nd that
(1 + η)Ω1
Ω0
= (1 + η)ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ
γϕσ
[
1 +
(1 − δ )γ
1 − δγ ϕ
]
≡ λ1
(1 + η)Ω3Ω1
Ω0
= (1 + η)δ ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ
ϕσ
[
1 +
(1 − δ )γ
1 − δγ ϕ
]
≡ λ2
γΩ3Ω2
Ω0
= δγ 2
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ
· (ϵ − 1)ϕσ
ϵ + (ϵ − 1)ϕ
· ϵ + (ϵ − 1)γϕ
(ϵ − 1)γϕσ
= δγ .
Bringing these results into (A59), we obtain the short-run Phillips curve:
(A60) (1 − δγ )m̂p(t) − λ1n̂(t) = δγ Et (pi (t + 1)) − λ2 Et (n̂(t + 1)).
Proof of lemma 6. The law of motion (12) for the perceived price markup comes from (A51). The
expression of the perceived price markup as a discounted sum of past ination rates is obtained
by iterating (A51) backward; and by noting that limT→∞ γT · m̂p(t −T ) = 0 as γ ∈ (0, 1) and m̂p is
bounded.
Proof of proposition 2. The short-runPhillips curve (13) comes from (A60). Thehybrid expression
of the short-run Phillips curve is obtained by combining (13) with (12).
Blanchard-Kahn representation. To complete the description of the log-linearized equilibrium,
we combine the equilibrium conditions (A51), (A52), and (A60) into a dynamical system of the
form proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Such system is useful to determine the existence
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and uniqueness of an equilibrium, and to solve numerically for the unique equilibrium when it
exists.
We rst combine (A51), (A52), and (A60) into a linear dynamical system:

γ γ 0
0 ψ α
0 0 λ1


m̂p(t − 1)
pi (t)
n̂(t)
 =

1 0 0
0 1 α
1 − δγ −δγ λ2


m̂p(t)
Et (pi (t + 1))
Et (n̂(t + 1))
 −

0
1
0
 ζ (t),
where
ζ (t) = î0(t) + â(t) − Et (â(t + 1))
is an exogenous shock realized at time t . The inverse of the matrix on the right-hand side is

1 0 0
0 1 α
1 − δγ −δγ λ2

−1
=

1 0 0
(1−δγ )α
λ2+αδγ
λ2
λ2+αδγ
−α
λ2+αδγ
δγ−1
λ2+αδγ
δγ
λ2+αδγ
1
λ2+αδγ
 .
Premultiplying the dynamical system by the inverse matrix, we obtain the Blanchard-Kahn form
of the system:

m̂p(t)
Et (pi (t + 1))
Et (n̂(t + 1))
 =

γ γ 0
(1−δγ )αγ
λ2+αδγ
λ2ψ+αγ (1−δγ )
λ2+αδγ
(λ2−λ1)α
λ2+αδγ
−(1−δγ )γ
λ2+αδγ
[δψ+δγ−1]γ
λ2+αδγ
λ1+αδγ
λ2+αδγ


m̂p(t − 1)
pi (t)
n̂(t)
 +

0
λ2
λ2+αδγ
δγ
λ2+αδγ
 ζ (t).
This dynamical systemdetermines perceived pricemarkupm̂p(t), inationpi (t), and employment
n̂(t). All the other variables directly follow.
Under the calibration in table 4, the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are satised, so the equilib-
rium exists and is determinate. Indeed, under such calibration, the eigenvalues of the matrix in
the Blanchard-Kahn system are 0.30, 1.02+0.03i, and 1.02−0.03i: one eigenvalue is within the unit
circle, and two are outside the unit circle. Further, the dynamical system has one predetermined
variable at time t (m̂p(t − 1)) and two nonpredetermined variables (n̂(t) and pi (t)). As the number
of eigenvalues outside the unit circle matches the number of nonpredetermined variables, there
exists a unique solution to the dynamical system (Blanchard and Kahn 1980, proposition 1).
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B.5. Calibration
We now calibrate the fairness-related parameters of the New Keynesian model. We do so by
matching the cost passthroughs estimated in microdata and those obtained by simulating the
behavior of a single rm facing a stochastic marginal cost.
Firm problem. This is a simplied version of the New Keynesian rm problem, which abstracts
from hiring decisions. The rm chooses price P(t) and output Y (t) to maximize the expected
present-discounted value of prots
E0
∞∑
t=0
δ t [P(t) −C(t)]Y (t),
subject to the demand
(A61) Yd(P(t),Cp(t − 1)) = P(t)−ϵF
(( ϵ
ϵ − 1
)1−γ [ P(t)
Cp(t − 1)
]γ )ϵ−1
and to the law of motion (7) for the perceived marginal costCp(t). The nominal marginal cost
C(t) is exogenous and stochastic.
To solve the rm’s problem, we set up the Lagrangian:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
δ t
{
[P(t) −C(t)]Y (t)
+H(t) [Yd(P(t),Cp(t − 1)) − Y (t)]
+K(t)
[ [
Cp(t − 1)]γ [ϵ − 1
ϵ
P(t)
] 1−γ
−Cp(t)
] }
,
whereH(t) is the Lagrange multiplier on the demand constraint in period t , and K(t) is the
Lagrange multiplier on the perceived marginal cost’s law of motion in period t .
First-order condition with respect to output. The rst-order condition with respect to Y (t) is
∂L/∂Y (t) = 0. It yields
H(t) = P(t)
[
1 − C(t)
P(t)
]
,
which is the same equation as (A32) and thus can be rewritten as (A33).
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First-order condition with respect to price. The rst-order condition with respect to P(t) is
∂L/∂P(t) = 0, which gives
0 = Y (t) +H(t)∂Y
d
∂P
+ (1 − γ )K(t)C
p(t)
P(t) .
This equation is the same as (A34); therefore, it can be re-expressed as (A35).
First-order condition with respect to perceived marginal cost. Finally, the rst-order condition
with respect toCp(t) is ∂L/∂Cp(t) = 0, which yields
0 = δ Et
(
H(t + 1)∂Y
d
∂Cp
+ γK(t + 1)C
p(t + 1)
Cp(t)
)
− K(t).
Using the elasticity given by (A18), we get
K(t) = δ Et
(
H(t + 1)Y (t + 1)
Cp(t)
[
E(Mp(t + 1)) − ϵ ] + γK(t + 1)Cp(t + 1)
Cp(t)
)
.
Next we multiply the equation byCp(t)/[Y (t)P(t)], and we insert the perceived price markups
Mp(t) = P(t)/Cp(t) andMp(t + 1) = P(t + 1)/Cp(t + 1). We get
K(t)
Y (t)Mp(t) = δ Et
(
Y (t + 1)P(t + 1)
Y (t)P(t)
{H(t + 1)
P(t + 1)
[
E(Mp(t + 1)) − ϵ ] + γ K(t + 1)
Y (t + 1)Mp(t + 1)
})
.
To conclude, we multiply the equation by (1−γ ); and we eliminateH(t + 1) using (A33) andK(t)
andK(t + 1) using (A35). We obtain the following pricing equation:
(A62)
M(t)−1
M(t) E(M
p(t))=1+δ Et
(
Y (t+1)P(t+1)
Y (t)P(t)
{
M(t+1)−1
M(t+1)
[
E(Mp(t+1))−(1−γ )ϵ ]−γ }) .
In steady state, this equation becomes (A44) and can therefore be written as (A46).
Firm pricing. The rm’s pricing behavior is described by four variables: the price P(t), markup
M(t), output Y (t), and perceived markupMp(t). These four variables are determined by four
conditions: the pricing equation (A62), M(t) = P(t)/C(t), the demand curve (A61), and the
perceived markup’s law of motion (A42).
Simulations. We start from a steady-state situation. To be consistent with the simulations of
gures 1 and 2, we assume that steady-state ination is zero, so the marginal costC is constant
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Figure A1. Simulated dynamics of cost passthrough
The cost passthrough represents the percentage increase in price when the marginal cost increases by 1%. The
empirical estimates of the cost passthrough (0.4 and 0.7) are obtained in section 5.3. The simulations are obtained
from the pricing model in appendix B.5 under the calibration in table 4.
in steady state. Then we impose an unexpected permanent 1% increase inC. We compute the
price response to this shock by solving the nonlinear dynamical system of four equations that
describes rm’s pricing. We then obtain the dynamics of the cost passthrough by calculating the
percentage change in price over time:
β(t) = P(t) − P
P
× 100.
Calibration procedure. As explained in section 5.3, we set the shape of the fairness function to
(6). We also set the discount factor to δ = 0.99. Then, using the simulations, we calibrate the
three main parameters of the model: the concern for fairness, θ , the degree of underinference,γ ,
and the elasticity of substitution between goods, ϵ . Our goal is to produce an instantaneous cost
passthrough of β = 0.4 and a two-year cost passthrough of β = 0.7, together with a steady-state
price markup ofM = 1.5.
Our calibration procedure starts by initializing θ and γ to some values. Using these values
and the targetM = 1.5, we compute ϵ from (A46). In (A46) we use (A8), which holds because
the fairness function is (6), and because customers are acclimated in steady state as there is no
ination.
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Using the values of θ , γ , and ϵ , we simulate the dynamics of the cost passthrough. We repeat
the simulation for different values of θ and γ until we obtain a passthrough of 0.4 on impact and
0.7 aer two years. We reach these targets with θ = 9 and γ = 0.8; the corresponding value of ϵ is
2.2. The dynamics of the cost passthrough under this calibration are displayed in gure A1.
Appendix C. Textbook New Keynesianmodel
We describe the textbook New Keynesianmodel used as benchmark in the simulations of gures 1
and 2. The model is borrowed from Gali (2008). The pricing friction in the model is the staggered
pricing of Calvo (1983). The literature alternatively use the price-adjustment cost of Rotemberg
(1982). However, both pricing frictions yield the same linearized Phillips curve around the zero-
ination steady state, so the simulations are the same in both cases (Roberts 1995, pp. 976–979).
The model’s dynamics around the zero-ination steady state are governed by an IS equation
and a short-run Phillips curve. The IS equation is given by (A52), as in the model with fairness.
This IS equation is obtained from equation (12) in Gali (2008, chap. 3), by using logarithmic
consumption utility, and by incorporating the production function (A49) and the monetary-policy
rule (9).
The short-run Phillips curve is given by
pi (t) = δ Et (pi (t + 1)) + κn̂(t),
where
κ ≡ (1 + η) · (1 − ξ )(1 − δξ )
ξ
· α
α + (1 − α) ϵ ,
and ξ is the fraction of rms keeping their prices unchanged each period. This Phillips curve is
obtained from equation (21) in Gali (2008, chap. 3), by using logarithmic consumption utility, and
by replacing the output gap by αn̂(t).21
The IS equation and short-run Phillips curve jointly determine employment n̂(t) and ination
pi (t). The other variables directly follow from n̂(t) and pi (t). Output ŷ(t) is given by (A49). The real
interest rate r̂ (t) is given by (A48). The price markup m̂(t) is given by (A50). And since households
observe both prices and costs, perceived and actual price markups are equal: m̂p(t) = m̂(t).
21The output gap is the logarithmic difference between the actual and natural levels of output. The natural levels of
output and employment are reached when prices are exible, so when the price markup is ϵ/(ϵ − 1). Since ϵ/(ϵ − 1)
is also the steady-state price markup, we infer from (A40) that the natural level of employment equals steady-state
employment. Hence, we infer from (8) that the natural level of output isYn(t) = A(t)(N )α . Consequently the output
gap is ln(Y (t)) − ln(Yn(t)) = α[ln(N (t)) − ln(N )] = αn̂(t).
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